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ANOTHER THEORY OF NONPROFIT 
CORPORATIONSt 
Ira Mark Ellman* 
There is a movement afoot to reform nonprofit corporation laws. 
Though long neglected by both draftsmen and legal scholars, this 
subject recently has attained greater prominence. California's new 
nonprofit code, enacted in 1979, was a major departure from prior 
laws.1 An American Bar Association committee is rewriting the As-
sociation's Model Nonprofit Corporation Act.2 At the same time, 
Professor Henry Hansmann has offered the first comprehensive ra-
tionale for the existence of nonprofits, a rationale intended to guide 
current law reform efforts.3· His two lengthy articles dominate the 
field and establish the topics for discussion. Those articles build a 
theory that explains the existence of all nonprofit corporations by 
reference to the concept of "contract failure," a special circumstance 
that arises when consumers are "incapable of accurately evaluating 
the goods promised or delivered,"4 thus rendering "ordinary con-
tractual services inadequate to provide the purchaser of the service 
with sufficient assurance that the service was in fact performed as 
t Copyright © 1982 by Ira Mark Ellman. 
• Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.A. 1967, Reed College; M.A. 1968, Uni-
versity of Illinois; J.D. 1973, University of California at Berkeley. - Ed. 
This Article was undertaken with the financial support of the Program on Nonprofit Or-
ganizations, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, and the author is grate-
ful to PONPO's Director, John Simon, for his encouragement, and to Mikey Hirschoff and 
Estelle James, fellow PONPO participants, for their helpful comments. James spent an enor-
mous amount of time gently persuading this recalcitrant pupil that there is more to economics 
than learning the definition of "marginal." Henry Hansmann was kind enough to read an 
earlier draft of this article, alerting me to a number of errors, some of which I have corrected .. I 
am too fond of those that remain to amend them. Finally, I would like to thank Dennis 
Karjala and David Kaye, each of whom possesses the critical eye and the inclination to hon-
esty necessary to keep a colleague working on a manuscript long after he had believed himself 
done. 
1. CAL. CORP. CooE §§ 5000-9927 (West 1981). 
2. Michael Hone, the principal draftsman of the California law, is now the reporter to the 
ABA Committee. The author worked full time with Professor Hone, as co-draftsman, from 
the beginning of the California project through the completion of the first exposure draft, and 
was, therefore, a substantial contributor to the final product. Some affinity for the California 
approach might therefore be expected, if not excused. 
3. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as Nonprofit Corporation Law]; Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 
YALE LJ. 835 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Nonprofit Enterprise}. 
4. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 3, at 843. 
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desired."5 This difficulty typically arises from the nature of the serv-
ice rather than from the nature of the consumer. 6 In developing this 
theory, Hansmann treats as the nonprofit's "consumers" all who 
transfer money to it, whether they are donors or customers. He calls 
this aggregated class "patrons."7 Donors to CARE and to a univer-
sity are thus "patrons," as are the students paying tuition and the 
dues-paying members of a nonprofit club or trade association. 
Approaching the topic from an economic perspective, Hansmann 
sees no reason to distinguish donors and customers, for both in fact 
enter into an exchange: The donor expects some result from his con-
tribution, whether it is an increase in food to the poor or opera to the 
cultured. From these assumptions, he develops a model for a non-
profit law structured to meet the need of patrons to overcome con-
tract failure. 
This Article argues that the distinction between donors and cus-
tomers is critical, and that the contract failure model is therefore ser-
iously flawed. It distinguishes two types of nonprofit corporations -
those structured to satisfy donors' needs ("donative nonprofits") and 
those structured to satisfy customers' needs ("mutual benefit non-
profits"). This dichotomy suggests a very different nonprofit corpo-
ration law than the one urged by Hansmann. Once the concept of 
contract failure is limited to donors, it can be refined to serve as part 
of the rationale for donative nonprofits. Refining the concept of con-
tract failure reveals, however, that it confuses the analysis of mutual 
benefit nonprofits, which actually solve a different problem for cus-
tomers and thus require a different corporate structure. 
The demography of nonprofit corporations might be unfamiliar 
to many readers. While the layman, and even the lay lawyer, often 
equates "nonprofit" with "charitable," only some nonprofit corpora-
tions are charitable in the usual sense of that term. Social clubs, 
trade organizations, and consulting companies, among others, are 
also formed as nonprofit corporations. 8 
The first Part of this Article places the discussion in context by 
outlining the purposes of a nonprofit corporation law. The second 
Part summarizes the Hansmann, or "contract failure," theory. The 
third Part develops an alternative theory and contrasts it with the 
5. Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 504. 
6. Id. at 505-07. 
7. Id. at 502-03. 
8. In California alone, it was estimated in 1978 that there were 62,000 nonprofit corpora• 
tions. Nida, Membership Lists: Balancing the Interests Between Use and Abuse, 13 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 797 (1979). 
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Hansmann thesis, considering first the donative nonprofits and then 
the mutual benefit nonprofits. 
I. THE FUNCTION OF A NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW 
A nonprofit corporation code provides only a portion of the law 
applicable to nonprofit corporations, but that portion presents a dis-
tinct range of questions. Most of the benefits that the law typically 
confers on nonprofit organizations, such as income tax exemptions; 
eligibility for tax deductible contributions, special mail rates, and 
property tax exemptions, are provided by laws other than the non-
profit corporation codes. These laws usually set their own standards 
and do not treat incorporation as a nonprofit as determinative.9 An 
organization may qualify as tax exempt without being incorporated 
at all, and certainly one may be incorporated as a nonprofit but fail 
to qualify for exemption.10 Issues such as tax subsidization are cer-
tainly important and have received their share of attention,1 1 but 
they are tangential to the corporation law issues and need not be 
addressed in developing a theory of nonprofit corporation law. The 
policy issues dealt with by a nonprofit corporation code can be con-
sidered in isolation from the package of benefits provided elsewhere. 
A corporation code deals principally with rules of internal gov-
ernance. Such rules are made necessary by incorporation: If the law 
is to recognize the existence of a new kind of "person," it must offer 
some means to distinguish between legitimate actions taken on that 
"person's" behalf and~unauthorized assertions of authority. This is 
necessary both for internal purposes - e.g., establishing who has 
authority to decide that membership fees should be increased - and 
for dealing with third parties - e.g., establishing who has authority 
to commit the corporation to the purchase or sale of property. Some 
of the rules in the code are designed to apply only when internal 
corporate documents fail to resolve the dispute. (May the contested 
action be taken by the president alone, or did it require board ap-
proval? Was a majority vote of the board sufficient, or was a vote of 
the members required?) A court may fill the gaps in the documents 
by using either a judge-made or a statutory rule. Where there is no 
statute, the court may draw inferences from the articulated internal 
9. Hansmann does an excellent job of surveying many of the other laws that set rules with 
particular application to nonprofit corporations. Nonproftt Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 
519-52. 
10. See B. HOPKINS, THB LAW OF TAX ExBMPr ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 1979), for a dis-
cussion of the tax code requirements. 
11. See Bittker and Rahdert, Tlte Exemption of NonprojiJ Organizations from Federal In-
come Taxation, 85 YALB LJ. 299 (1976), and authorities cited therein. 
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agreement, as it appears in corporate articles, bylaws, or in other 
documents reflecting the understanding of the parties. 12 While an 
initial examination may establish that the agreement is silent on the 
question of whether a vote of the members is required before a par-
ticular action could be taken, parts of the agreement may indicate 
persuasively that such a vote was reasonably expected. 13 This kind 
of gap filling is no more than what courts ordinarily do; it is certainly 
appropriate, but it does not require an elaborate corporation law. If 
no more than this were needed, our corporation law could be limited 
to two sections: one requiring enforcement of contracts and internal 
agreements, and a second authorizing judicial gap filling. There are, 
however, four needs that statutory rules can fill that our two section 
law would not satisfy. These are taken up in order below. 
A. Needlepoint 
Every corporation code includes some sections that merely facili-
tate the paper shuffling involved in the creation, registration, and 
dissolution of corporations. There are rules that specify the methods 
by which articles are filed, fees are paid, and agents for service of 
process are designated. Such needlepoint rules are necessary, but 
they can easily ]?e borrowed from state business corporation statutes. 
Since they raise no important policy issues, this Article will not deal 
with them. 
B. Statutory Gap Fillinga 
Statutory rules can, to some extent, relieve the courts of the chore 
of particularized gap filling. Often, a general rule sacrifices no par-
ticularized justice: The judge could not tailor the decision to the par-
ties' probable intent because the agreement in question offers so little 
12. Ellman, J)rivenfrom the Tribunal· Judicial Resolution of Internal Church J)isputes, 69 
CALIF. L. REv. 1378, 1422-28 (1981). 
13. In addition to the cases cited in Ellman, supra note 12, see Jessie v. Boynton, 372 Mass. 
293, 361 N.E.2d 1267 (1977). In Jessie, the court found that management's conduct of a mem-
bership meeting might have violated fiduciary duties to the membership, thereby invalidating 
certain amendments to the corporate bylaws adopted at that meeting. The court implied that 
the content of management's fiduciary duty could be found by looking to the existing gov-
erning structure adopted by the corporation and set out in its internal documents. A nonprofit 
corporation need not have voting members at all; it can lodge governing authority entirely 
within the board of directors. Thus, there can be no general rule of corporate law requiring 
board members to adhere to defined democratic processes in internal governance. Nonethe-
less, where the internal agreement does vest some governance authority in a broadly based 
membership operating under normal democratic principles, the courts should infer a require-
ment that the conduct of membership meetings must comply with certain generally accepted 
democratic principles. In so doing, the court is filling in the details of the parties' agreement in 
a manner that is consistent with the articulated portions of the agreement. 
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guidance that he can only rely on general principles. General statu-
tory rules are best used to deal with situations in which there can be 
some consensus as to an acceptable approach. Most people expect, 
for example, that the majority prevails in a vote of the members, at 
least absent an alternative agreement; few would object to a law that 
so provides. Such rules reduce uncertainty. If a dispute arises, the 
parties or their lawyers can look to the statute for an answer. The 
parties might still argue over whether an agreement between them 
overrides the rule, but at least they will know which rule applies ab-
sent an agreement. Because nonprofit organizations are notorious 
for their informal organizational arrangements and incomplete re-
cordkeeping, the existence of such statutory rules of thumb can be 
very helpful. 
C. Value-Based Rules 
A third function of a corporation code is to impose upon the in-
ternal operation of the corporation certain rules to which it must ad-
here, regardless of any internal agreements to the contrary. Such 
value-based rules, like the gap-filling rules, result in part from the 
need to formalize the entity's structure. For example, the code might 
require every corporation to have a board of directors with certain 
powers, simply to allow third parties to identify conveniently the 
people authorized to make certain decisions. 14 Value-based rules 
can also be judge-made. For example, the courts have sp~cified pro-
cedural safeguards that must be followed before a member of a non-
profit corporation may be expelled, to ensure a minim:tl level ~f 
procedural fairness in the conduct of corporate affairs. 15 There are 
code rules with similar functions. Some codes, for example, contain 
rules regarding the conduct of membership meetings, board meet-
ings, or elections.16 Value-based rules like these are really the corpo-
_rate equivalent of consumer protection legislation. 
D. Defining Rules 
Like value-based rules, defining rules are also mandatory; they 
14. E.g., .AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATlON, MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 17 
(1964). 
15. Such cases are almost too numerous to mention. The classic article is Chafee, Tlte 
Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HAR.v. L. REv. 993 (1930). A more recent and 
more voluminous collection of cases can be found in .Developments in the Law - Judical Con-
trol of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REv. 983 (1963). 
16. The new California law contains both a section setting minimum procedural standards 
for expulsions and one on the election of directors. CAL. CoRP. CooE §§ 5341, 5520-26, 7520-
26 (West 1981). 
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differ from value-based rules, however, in that their function is to 
establish the essential characteristics of the organization for which 
the cocie is drafted. They are the axioms of the statutory scheme, 
providing the fundamental principles that guide our choices con-
cerning the other three kinds of rules. The shareholders of a busi-
ness corporation are not given limited liaoility because that result is 
so compellingly just. The reason is rather the perceived societal need 
for a form or organization in which owner-investors have limited 
liability. The premise is that there are socially desirable activities 
that can be facilitated by the existence of an organizational alterna-
tive to business partnerships. A good set of defining rules establishes 
a distinctive form of organization that has some functional advan-
tage in certain circumstances - a form of organization that would 
have ''buyers." 
This analysis conceives of a corporation code as a means by 
which to facilitate activity. Antisocial activity will be regulated by 
law regardless of the organizational form used to pursue it. Even 
though it may have a number of mandatory rules, therefore, the cor-
poration code is not regulatory in its essential purpose. Instead, we 
use the code to create a legal structµre that is useful as a vehicle for a 
particular type of legitimate activity. In a jurisdiction with well-
drafted laws, organizers should have little difficulty in choosing 
among the organizational alternatives, and every group of individu-
als pursuing a lawful activity should be able to find a form of organi-
zation that meets its needs: an organization whose defining rules fit 
the group's raison d'etre, whose gap-filling rules tend to meet the par-
ticipants' expectations, and whose value-based rules help to protect 
both the participants and third parties from abuses of the organiza-
tional form. 
In the next Part, I examine the Hansmann thesis, focusing on the 
defining rules that he advocates. These defining rules are exception-
ally important because they form the basis of the entire structure of 
nonprofit corporation law that Hansmann would advocate. 
Hansmann's defining rules would subject all nonprofit corporations 
· to a variant of the strict trust law standards in their handling of cor-
porate property. The remainder of this Article examines the 
Hansmann approach and offers a functionally superior alternative. 
II. THE CONTRACT FAILURE THEORY 
At one time most nonprofit laws limited the purpose for which a 
nonprofit corporation could be formed, and that restriction alone 
made nonprofit corporations distinctive. But the law has begun to 
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move away from such restrictions, toward an approach that would 
permit use of the nonprofit form by any group that sees its ?,Ctivities 
as compatible with that structure.17 Although few viewed it this way, 
once the purpose limits were repealed, the problem was to identify 
the defining rules establishing a legal structure distinctively suitable 
for the organizations that had traditionally gone under the label 
"nonprofit." Yet because the law had relied upon restrictive purpose 
clauses to give nonprofit corporations their distinctive identity, little 
thought had been given to whether the nonprofit laws did, or should, 
establish a distinctive internal structure for nonprofits. 
Even before Hansmann's work, commentators had observed that 
nonprofit corporation laws typically bar the issuance of dividends to 
members.18 Although this no-dividend rule had been offered, in ef-
fect, as the defining rule of nonprofit corporations, no one before 
Hansmann had seriously examined it. He offers an extensive theory 
of nonprofits, using the no-dividend rule as the defining feature. 
To permit the rule to carry this burden, Hansmann expands it 
beyond its traditional scope. He assumes that the purpose of the div-
idend ban is to prevent ''the distribution of net earnings to control-
ling individuals."19 Yet because controlling individuals could gain 
access to the corporation's earnings through many methods other 
than the issuance of dividends, such as excess compensation, self-
dealing transactions, or the distribution of assets upon dissolution, 
Hansmann urges that the no-dividend rule be "refined" to prohibit 
these and all other potential strategies of "abuse."20 In effect, 
Hansmann takes many of the trust law's traditional rules, such as the 
absolute ban on self-dealing transactions, and argues that they 
should be part of a "complete" no-dividend rule. The result would 
be to tighten standards considerably, perhaps beyond even the level 
of traditional trust law, and to expand traditional rules on standing 
to raise claims of defalcation. 21 
While Hansmann's expanded no-dividend rule would be a major 
17. For discussion of this shift in the purpose requirements imposed by nonprofit corpora-
tion laws, see Note, Nonprofit Corporations- Definition, 11 V AND. L. REv. 336 (1963) [herein-
after cited as Vanderbilt Note]; Note, Permissible Purposes far Nonprofit Corporations, 51 
CoLUM. L. REv. 889 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]. 
18. See Columbia Note, supra note 17; Vanderbilt Note, supra note 17. 
19. See Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 553. 
20. See generally, id. at 553-79. 
21. A good exploration of the state of the law on charitable corporations, still largely accu-
rate, is Karst, The Efficiency of. tlte Cltaritable Dollar: An U'!fo!ftlled State Responsibility, 73 
HARV. L. REv. 433 (1960). See generally M. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERN-
MENT (1965); A.B.A Committee, Duties of Trustees and Directors of Cltaritable Corporations, 2 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 545 (1967). 
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addition to the nonprofit corporation law as such, the actual effect of 
the rule would vary among different nonprofits. Nonprofits that are 
considered charitable are usually already required to adhere to tradi-
tional trust rules, while others, like trade associations, are not.22 This 
differing treatment under existing law does not arise from nonprofit 
corporation codes, which generally do not impose traditional trust 
rules. It derives instead from other sources, such as tax and charita-
ble trust law, which impose their own requirements selectively on 
those nonprofits that are considered charitable.23 Hansmann's rules 
do differ from traditional trust rules in some details, at least one of 
which is important enough to warrant extended discussion below,24 
but most charitable nonprofits are already required to comply with 
most of what he advocates. For the noncharitable nonprofits, how-
ever, the change would be dramatic. 25 
22. See People v. Larkin, 413 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Lynch v. Spilman, 67 Cal. 2d 
251,431 P.2d 636, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1967); In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Socy., 40 Cal. 2d 
852, 257 P.2d I (1953); Younger v. Wisdom Socy., 121 Cal. App. 3d 683, 175 Cal. Rptr. 542 
(1981); Gbur v. Cohen, 93 Cal. App. 3d 296, 155 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1979); Lynch v. John M, 
Redfield Found., 9 Cal. App. 3d 293, 88 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1970); Eurich v. Korean Found., Inc., 
31 ill. App. 2d 474, 176 N.E.2d 692 (1961); Louisa York Orphan Asylum v. Erwin, 281 A.2d 
453 (Me. 1971). The most co=only cited case to the contrary is Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes 
Natl. Training School, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974), which was followed in Midlantic 
Natl. Bank v. Frank G. Thompson Found., 170 NJ. Super. 128, 405 A.2d 866 (1979). These 
last two cases apply the more lax corporate law rules on conflicts of interests to directors of 
charitable corporations. 
23. The cases cited in note 22 supra relied on trust law. The new California nonprofit 
corporation law is unusual, in that it explicitly addresses this question. For public benefit 
corporations, a category that overlaps the traditional category of charitable corporations to a 
great extent, the California law adopts a standard for self-dealing transactions that is consider-
ably stricter than the business corporation standard, although it does permit approval of trans• 
actions involving conflicts of interests where proponents of the transaction prove, for example, 
that the transaction is fair. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 5233 (West 1981). See Abbott & Kornblum, 
The Jurisdiction of the Attorney General Over Corporate Fiduciaries Under the New Calf/om/a 
Nonprofit Corporation Law, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 891, 897 (1979). Cases also arise under the tax 
law where the corporation has sought eligibility to receive tax deductible contributions. Such 
eligibility requires not only that the corporation ~ "charitable" but also that it be organized to 
serve a public rather than a private interest Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(il) (1981) and 
§ 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) and (4). If the nonprofit organization fails to comply, the most co=on 
result is revocation of the favorable tax status,see, e.g., Unitary Mission Church v. Commr., 74 
T.C. 507 (1980); Best Lock Corp. v. Commr., 31 T.C. 1217 (1959). Reliance on the tax law to 
enforce such fiduciary obligations is problematical. See Karst, supra note 21, at 437-43. The 
tax law imposes additional and considerably more stringent rules upon those charitable corpo-
rations which are considered private foundations. I.R.C § 4940-4948. 
24. Hansmann departs from the existing trust law in viewing the management of nonprofit 
corporations as owing some special duty to all ''patrons," which includes purchasers. See Part 
m, Section A(3) infta. 
25. There are only a handful of cases on fiduciary duties in noncharitable nonprofits, but 
they do generally rely on business corporation law rather than trust law. See Avila South 
Condo. Assn., Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977); Milton Frank Allen Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Georgia Assn. of Petroleum Retailers, Inc., 224 Ga. 518, 162 S.E.2d 724 (1968), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1025 (1969). The new California nonprofit corporation law adopts a 
special conflict of interest rule for public benefit corporations (which are analogous to charita-
ble corporations), while adopting the business corporation rule for mutual benefit corpora-
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To understand that change, one must compare traditional trust 
rules with business corporation rules. There are a number of differ-
ences in their treatment of self-dealing transactions - deals between 
the corporation and its directors. In the business corporation, unlike· 
the trust, an otherwise offending transaction between the corporation 
and its directors can be sustained if it is shown to be fair to the cor-
poration.26 A number of cases suggest that shareholder approval of 
a self-dealing transaction will immunize it from attack on mere un-
fairness grounds, leaving it voidable only if fraud or waste27 are 
shown, and some cases suggest that even fraud may be ratified.28 In 
1975, California amended its business corporation law to provide 
that a self-dealing transaction need be shown 'just and reasonable" 
only when there has not been shareholder ratification.29 
In some cases it seems quite sensible to give shareholders of busi-
ness corporations the final word on disputed transactions. Certainly 
in a close corporation, with involved and informed shareholders, a 
vote by disinterested shareholders to approve a transaction between 
the corporation and a director should not be vulnerable to a court 
ruling of unfairness. We should rely on the shareholders to protect . 
their own interests. Exceptions may be appropriate where share-
holder approval is not unanimous and where the transaction is so 
extremely unbalanced as to amount to a gift, or to a waste of corpo-
rate assets. Such lines may, of course, be difficult to draw. 
But in any event, the same issues do not arise iri.. the context of the 
charitable corporation, for there are not the same a priori reasons to 
defer to shareholder decisions. The members of the charitable cor-
poration are the analogue to the shareholders, yet often the members 
and directors will be the same people. Ratification by members will 
thus not involve any external scrutiny of the directors' decision. 
More important, the members have no financial interest at stake to 
motivate their scrutiny, nor is there the same dearth of public policy 
tions. Compare the treatment of conflict of interest in CAL. CORP. ConE §310 (West 1981) 
(business corporations) with that in§ 5233 (public benefit nonprofits) and§ 7233 (mutual ben-
efit nonprofits). 
26. Compare Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del 1976) (business corporation rule) 
with People v. Larkin, 413 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Cal 1976) (application of trust rule to charita-
ble corporation). 
27. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512,518 (Del. Ch. 1978); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. 
Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962) (those attacking the transaction must show either that the 
shareholder ratification was obtained through misrepresentation, or that "no person of ordi-
nary, sound business judgment would be expected to entertain the view that the consideration 
was . • . fair''). 
28. See Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955) (ratifying sharehold-
ers must be disinterested and not induced to ratify by misrepresentations). 
29. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE§ 310(a)(l) (West 1981) with § 310(a)(2)-(3). 
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reasons to oversee their decision. To the contrary, since the funds 
are not the members', their ratification is not presumptively determi-
native. There is good reason for courts to scrutinize the transaction, 
to protect the interests of both the donors and society generally. 
A second difference between corporate and trust law derives 
from the traditional trust rule requiring charitable organizations to 
use their funds for their specified charitable purposes. In the context 
of charitable nonprofit corporations, this rule has been read to bar 
charitable corporations from applying existing resources to newly 
adopted purposes.30 This rule ensures that the donors' contributions 
will not be applied to a different charitable program than that which 
they intended to support.31 Business corporations, on the other 
hand, can normally amend their articles and change their purposes. 
There is no reason for the law to bar shareholders from deciding to 
commit their resources to some newly agreed-upon endeavor. 
Hansmann does not explicitly address this traditional trust rule, and 
it is, therefore, not certain that he would argue for its general appli-
cation to all nonprofit corporations. As discussed below, however, 
Hansmann is otherwise consistent in arguing that there should be 
but one set of rules for all nonprofits, and it seems likely that he 
would insist that all should be governed by a single rule here as well. 
And the trust rule, rather than the corporate rule, seems more com-
patible with his theory. 
Our brief description of the traditional trust rules suggests why 
they are sensibly applied to charities, but the traditional explanations 
would not extend them, as Hansmann would, to remaining nonprof-
its. Such an extension, therefore, requires additional explanation. 
Hansmann's explanation is that the rule responds to the phenome-
non of "contract failure." He argues that there are certain enter-
prises in which consumers have special difficulty in ensuring 
compliance with contract terms. For example, donors to CARE 
have no practical method by which to determine whether the organi-
zation actually supplies food to starving Biafrans. Contract failure 
can also occur where services are purchased: Hansmann posits that 
purchasers of child care services share the CARE donors' problem 
because they have difficulty evaluating the service received. He calls 
this condition "contract failure" apparently because the inability to 
evaluate makes it difficult, if not impossible, to effect the donor's or 
purchaser's desires through ordinary contractual relationships.32 
30. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 3S9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977). 
31. Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 8S2, 264 P.2d S39, S43 (19S3). 
32. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 3, at 843-S4. 
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By using the single term "contract failure," Hansmann obscures 
the difference between these two examples. But because we shall see 
below that the difference is critical, it is ·important at the outset to 
understand it. The CARE donor's problem lies in monitoring the 
marginal impact of the dollar he gives. Hansmann refers generally 
to the donor's difficulty in seeing whether the service he paid for was 
delivered. Yet even if the donor knows that CARE is providing food 
to the needy, he will have great difficulty knowing whether it pro-
vided any more food to the needy as a result of his particular contri-
bution. Donors can often see that the donee is carrying on the 
charitable program: The university holds classes and the museum 
displays art. But the donor cannot tell whether the classes or the art 
have improved or grown because of his dollar. 
This problem never arises in the purchase of a private good de-
livered to the buyer. The marginal impact of my purchase of a car-
rot is clear: I now have the carrot. Even where I buy a good to be 
delivered to another, monitoring is not a problem where the recipi-
ent has been specified. I can see the marginal impact of the dollar I 
gave to the florist: My wife received a rose. But when I give money 
to CARE to provide food to unspecified third parties, monitoring the 
marginal impact becomes very difficult. Even if I know that CARE 
provided food to some needy people, it is virtually impossible for me 
ever to tell whether any food was delivered on account of my dollar. 
The same problem arises when I give an organization money to pro-
vide a "public good." Economists define "public goods" as goods 
that can be consumed by additional persons with no reduction in 
cons~ption by the earlier buyers. It is usually difficult to exclude 
consumption of public goods by those who do not pay for them. The 
government provides many public goods, such as national defense, 
since the market mechanism does not prompt others to provide 
them. However, some nonprofits provide public goods. Public tele-
vision programming is one example discussed by Hansmann.33 
When I consume the product by turning on my television, I do not 
reduce anyone else's opportunity to view, and I can watch the pro-
gramming without paying. The contract failure experienced by the 
donor to public television is precisely the same as that experienced 
by the donor to CARE: It is impossible to monitor the marginal 
impact of his dollar. 
Marginal impact monitoring is not a problem to the purchaser of 
child care; he can see that his child has been admitted to the nursery. 
33. Id at 848-54. 
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What Hansmann posits is not a marginal impact problem, but a 
quality-monitoring problem. The buyer has difficulty telling 
whether the nursery is doing a good job. Hansmann argues that the 
consequence is the same since in both cases there is a monitoring 
problem that reduces the utility of contract as a means of ensuring 
delivery of the desired product. Both are, therefore, examples of 
"contract failure." 
Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between these two 
forms of contract failure. In transactions commonly described as 
"donations," marginal impact monitoring is generally difficult or im-
possible. In transactions commonly described as purchases, margi-
nal impact monitoring is quite easy. Quality monitoring problems, 
on the other hand, could arise in both cases. I will have the same 
difficulty monitoring the quality of service provided by the free 
health clinic as that provided by my own doctor. With the free 
health clinic, however, I have the additional problem of marginal 
impact monitoring- of knowing whether any service at all was pro-
vided as a result of my donation, and if so, how much. 
Hansmann argues that the expanded no-dividend rule overcomes 
the transactional obstacles created by both forms of contract failure. 
Because he cannot monitor compliance with the terms of an agree-
ment, the donor or purchaser relies instead on safeguards inherent in 
the nonprofit form: the no-dividend rule and the strict fiduciary 
standards. These safeguards cannot ensure competence - indeed, 
the absence of a profit opportunity may reduce efficiency. But they 
do, according to Hansmann, at least provide assurance that the do-
nor's or purchaser's funds will not go to the private gain of the cor-
poration's managers. CARE will not simply pocket the money; the 
child care provider will not use it to pay inflated salaries or investors' 
returns. With these possibilities eliminated, there is a greater chance 
that the funds will be spent to feed the starving or to provide high 
quality child care. 
The premise that nonprofits should be designed to overcome con-
tract failure shapes the corporation. law that Hansmann urges. 
Under Hansmann's theory, the obligations of a nonprofit organiza-
tion's management are owed not so much to society generally as to 
the particular donors or purchasers who supply the nonprofit's 
funds. They are the ones for whose benefit nonprofits are organized; 
they are the ones who experience "contract failure" and who rely on 
the nonprofit law to deal with it. Hansmann therefore places these 
two ordinarily separated classes into a single group that he calls 
"patrons." 
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This definition of patron may include purchasers from as well as 
donors to the same nonprofit. For example, hospital patients are 
"patrons," so Hansmann would give them standing to raise claims of 
defalcation, whereas traditional law would grant standing only to the 
state attorney general and members of the hospital's board. 
Hansmann's theory suggests, moreover, that substantive claims · 
against the nonprofit can be personal to the patrons. As we shall see 
below, Hansmann applies the contract failure theory to find a duty 
to patients which restricts the hospital's right to earn profits on serv-
ices to them. Traditional charitable trust law, on the other hand, 
would require the hospital to adhere to the trust purpose, which 
might be a general one, like providing health care to a certain com-
munity. That purpose would usually be found in the hospital's arti-
cles of incorporation or. in the trust instrument under which the 
hospital received its founding gift. Such a rule ensures compliance 
with the expectations of the donors. Beyond adherence to its chari-
table purpose, traditional trust law would be concerned only with 
financial irregularities, such as careless or self-interested investment 
policies. 
The principle that duties flow to "patrons" would also affect mu-
. tual benefit nonprofits such as social clubs and trade associations. 
They traditionally have a membership which chooses the board, and 
to whom the board is responsible. For Hansmann, however, the 
·board of a nonprofit is responsible to its "patrons" and not to its 
. ''members."34 In part to make this point, Hansmann offers an exam-
ple of a nonprofit health maintenance organization that charges non-
members more for medical services than it charges members; such a 
practice would violate Hansmann's proposed fiduciary duty ''to as-
sure all of its patrons that the payments they make are being used to 
34. The term "member'' is used in at least two different ways in the nonprofit world. In the 
corporate law sense, ''member'' ordinarily means only those people who, under the organiza-
tion's internal governing rules, have the right to vote for directors or on other internal matters. 
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE§ 5056 (West 1981). When I use the term ''member'' in this Arti-
cle, I mean it in this corporate law sense. Of course, ''member'' is a term also used less for-
mally, and by for-profit as well as nonprofit organizations. For example; a proprietary athletic 
club will issue "memberships" that amount to no more than a contractual right to use the 
club's facilities. In addition, some nonprofit organizations will sell ''memberships" as a fund-
raising device, without conferring on those ''members" any 'internal governance rights in the 
organization. For example, a charitable organization such as the Cancer Society may in fact 
be governed entirely by a self-perpetuating board of directors, and have no members (in the 
corporate law sense) other than the directors themselves. Nonetheless, the public may be 
asked to purchase ''memberships" as a donation, and as a result of such purchases the "mem-
bers" might receive a pin or other token of their contribution, and may be placed on a mailing 
list to receive newsletters or other organizational publications. Members in this second, less 
formal sense have no relationship to the organization other than as contributors. 
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provide them exclusively with health services."35 
In focusing so heavily on patrons' personal interests, Hansmann 
deemphasizes the more general obligations of nonprofit management 
that traditional trust law would recognize. For example, Hansmann 
rejects,' as a defense of a pricing policy that yields profits on services 
to some hospital patients, the desire "to subsidize services that have 
more personal appeal to doctors, such as research or treatment of 
exotic or difficult cases."36 Traditional trust law would routinely ac-
cept, as serving a legitimate charitable purpose, the allocation of re-
sources to research, or the training of doctors in treatment of 
"difficult" cases. The hospital, of course, also has the charitable pur-
pose of providing medical care to its patients - Hansmann's "pa-
trons" - but traditional rules would not inquire into management's 
allocations among its charitable activities. Indeed, traditional trust 
law would rarely inquire into management's self-interested behavior 
unless it was financially self-interested; there certainly would be no 
basis for challenging management action on the ground that it em-
phasizes activities that "appeal" to the doctors. 
The contract failure theory is simple and elegant, a particularly 
effective combination in a previously theory-less field with an in-
credibly diverse range of organizations. That elegance, however, is 
purchased by collapsing donors and buyers into the single category 
of patrons, donatives and mutual benefits into nonprofits, and margi-
nal-impact and quality-monitoring problems into contract failure. 
This aggregation invites general statements that seem correct only 
because the language employed .obscures important differences 
among the concepts. Part III reveals this difficulty by unpacking 
these terms. It starts by looking at donative nonprofits and then pro-
ceeds to consider mutual benefits. 
35. See Nonprofit Corporation Law, Slfl'ra note 3, at 559. Hansmann's example presumes a 
"membership controlled health maintenance organization" in which admission to membership 
requires the "acquiescence of the existing members." Id. Of course, the patient-members of 
the typical health maintenance organization are not members at all in the corporate law sense, 
but merely purchasers of a particular form of health insurance. Thus, they never vote on 
anything, not even the selection of the organization's management. The type of organization 
that Hansmann envisions is what I will subsequently describe as a mutual benefit nonprofit 
corporation, in which formal control over the organization's management is lodged in its cus-
tomers. Social clubs would be a typical example. In such an organization excessive sales to 
nonmembers would present a problem, but it would not be Hansmann's asserted problem of 
violation of the nondistribution constraint or of management's fiduciary duties to 1ts patrons. 
See text at notes 92-96 infra. 
36. Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 561. 
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Ill. CRITIQUE OF THE CONTRACT FAILURE THEORY 
A. .Donative Nonprofits 
I. "Contract Failure" .Does Not Explain the Need 
for Strict Standards 
1013 
Contributors to the donative nonprofits - organizations like 
CARE, the Salvation Army, and the American Red Cross, which 
receive contributions from one group of people and perform services 
for another group - appear, on the surface, to experience "contract 
failure." It is difficult and costly for them to monitor the marginal 
impact of their contributions. Hansmann suggests that potential do-
nors might, therefore, prefer a nonprofit recipient committed to high 
fiduciary standards and bound ·by a rule barring the distribution of 
any profits to owners. Does the nonprofit structure urged by 
Hansmann in fact improve the donor's position in a way that could 
not be achieved through contract? 
The strict fiduciary standards - the ban on self-dealing transac-
tions, excess compensation, and the like - plus the no-dividend rule 
would bar some potential uses of the donor's dollar. While the do-
nor remains ignorant of the marginal impact of his dollar, his igno-
rance is reduced since there are fewer possibilities. Indeed, if the 
donor is indifferent to the choice among the remaining possible uses 
of his dollar, then he has no problems. The special rules solve the 
contract failure problem if three conditions are met: (a). the donor is 
indifferent as among the remaining lawful uses. of his dollar, (b) he 
would prefer the lawful uses to any of the unlawful uses, and (c) he is 
able to monitor, and ensure compliance with, the fiduciary rules and 
the dividend ban. 
In many situations a donor will not be indifferent among the re-
maining lawful choices. A donor to a university might prefer that 
his gift aid undergraduate students in financial need, and not re-
search on nonprofit corporations. Such donors may earmark their 
funds for the particular charitable program they favor. In some 
cases, it may be fairly easy for the donor to see that this program 
exists - there are undergraduates receiving financial aid. As we 
pointed out above, however, the suspicious donor is not reassured by 
this observation because he cannot really know whether his gift in-
creases the level of financial aid that would have otherwise existed, 
or whether it freed the university administrators to reallocate other 
funds that would have gone to financial aid, but are now spent on 
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research on nonprofit corporations.37 To the extent that donors care 
about these possibilities, strict fiduciary rules will not fully solve 
their problem. 
Some donors, however, might not care very much. And even for 
the others, strict fiduciary rules will help if condition (b) is met. That 
is, so long as the strict fiduciary rules eliminate the donor's least fa-
vored uses, the donor's situation is improved, even though he re-
mains unable to monitor the precise result of his dollar. Estelle 
James has developed this argument more completely.38 She points 
out that' when marginal-impact monitoring is difficult, a business en-
terprise will treat receipts as fixed revenue - that is, revenue not 
dependent on output. The receipt of such revenue will not prompt 
the manager to increase output; he will merely pocket the money. If 
the law prohibits such pocketing, however, the manager will neces-
sarily increase output. If the dividend ban and strict fiduciary rules 
eliminate the pocketing, then donors should prefer nonprofit donees 
to for-profit donees. Nonprofit donees may still increase the wrong 
output, insofar as the donor is concerned, but that is better than in-
creasing no output at all. 
James' analysis helps us to understand the role of a dividend ban 
and fiduciary rules that bar alternative methods of distributing gains 
to owners, such as excess compensation and self-dealing transac-
tions. Nonetheless, this ~alysis does not clinch the case for apply-
ing trust rules to nonprofit corporations. Donors may be concerned 
about transactions between the nonprofit corporation and its man-
agement only if those transactions are unfair to the corporation. 
When the director of a nonprofit university is in the office supply 
business, the traditional trust rule would bar him from selling sup-
plies to the school. Yet if the director, in an effort to help out the 
school, offers to sell it such supplies at his wholesale cost, it is diffi-
cult to believe that donors would object. Indeed, they might favor 
37. Fundraisers understand this problem and do their best to make donors feel that they 
know the particular impact of their gift. It may be easier to raise funds for capital expenditures 
because the donor can see the result of his gift. Indeed, one sometimes sees the names of 
individual donors on the various pieces of a building, providing some immortality, but also 
giving the donor the feeling that he bought this room or that door. The donor may also reduce 
the problem by giving to a charity with only one very focused program, e.g., research in sickle-
cell anemia. Very large donors may avoid the problem: When their gift pays for an entire 
building, or for an entire new program, they may be fairly confident that the donee would not 
have otherwise undertaken the project in question. But despite those tactics of fundraiscrs and 
donors, the majority of smaller donors cannot know the marginal impa~ of their 
contributions. 
38. See James, Production, Consumption, and Cross-Subsidization in Nonprofit Corpora-
tions, Working Paper #38, Program on Nonprofit Organizations, Institute for Social and Pol-
icy Studies, Yale University (1982). 
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such a transaction. If the trust rules were adopted, it thus seems that 
condition (b) might not be met since the rules might mak~ illegal a 
transaction that the donor would prefer. The transaction would be 
permitted under the typical corporate standard because it could not 
be proven unfair to the corporation, as indeed it is not. It would also 
be permitted under the new California law, whic~ is nonetheless 
stricter than the corporate rule.39 
In sum, it seems that the no-dividend rule, combined with some 
package of rules guarding against financially self-interested behavior 
by nonprofit management, will help the donor cope with the prob-
lem -of marginal-impact monitoring, although such rules will not 
solve that problem. The strict trust rules urged by Hansmann, more-
over, do not follow from the analysis since they might bar a use of 
his money that the donor would favor. 
No rules will help, however, if they cannot be enforced, as condi-
tion (c) requires. The problem of marginal-impact monitoring is not 
solved by adopting rules that are themselves difficult to monitor. In 
fact, it seems likely that the cost of monitoring and enforcing trust 
rules will be more than most doriors would find worthwhile to pay. 
That is one reason to provide for enforcement of charitable trust du-
ties by state agencies such as the attorney general, as mos~ states do. 
Traditional law thus attacks the donor's problem by both stricter 
fiduciary rules and state enforcement. Nonetheless, state enforce-
ment is often inadequate because the states themselves are not pre-
pared to pay for it.40 We could reduce state enforcement costs by 
adopting a fiat rule barring any transactions between management 
and the corporation, rather than a rule requiring the state to prove 
that the transaction in question was unfair to the corporation. In 
deciding whether to impose a flat rule, one would have to balance 
the savings in enforcement costs against the possibility that the law 
will deter transactions that are actually favorable to the corporation 
and that donors would not oppose. The new California law com-
promises this conflict by avoiding a fiat rule barring all transactions 
between the corporation and its management, but requiring instead 
that the party seeking to sustain the transaction prove both that it is 
fair and that no more advantageous arrangement could have been 
obtained by the corporation under the circumstances.41 
39. See CAL. CORP. CoDE § 5233(d)(2) (West 1981). Hansmann prefers the strict trust 
rule, but seems willing to accept the California standard as second best. See Nonprofit Corpo-
ration Law, supra note 3, at 569-73. 
40. See Karst, supra note 21, at 452. 
41. See CAL. CORP. CODE§ 5233(d)(2) (West 1981). 
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• Finally, we must consider whether imposing these rules by law 
improves the donor's position over that which could be achieved 
through contract. If contract alone is adequate, a new organizational 
form ~ not needed. As Hansmann himself points out,42 the ex-
panded no-dividend rule (simple dividend ban combined with strict 
.fiduciary duties owed to patrons) could be imposed by contract if 
donors and nonprofits agreed. Professional donors, such as private 
foundations and government agencies in the grantmaking business, 
often require recipients to adhere to rules similar to those that 
Hansmann would impose.43 These rules, then, would not alter the 
position of savvy or concerned donors. Of course, not every donor 
would bother to bargain for such promises, and many will contem-
plate gifts too small to motivate the recipient to agree to the de-
mands, even if they were made. That is to say, in some cases the 
transaction costs of generating such a contract ("contracting costs") 
would exceed what the parties are willing to spend, while in other 
cases the recipient organization might be unwilling to enter into such 
an agreement on its merits, even apart from these contracting costs. 
To the extent that one envisions the nonprofit law as a form of 
contract freely available to parties, it might in some cases reduce 
contracting costs - that is, some parties who would not have under-
taken to produce their own agreement spelling out strict standards 
might nonetheless freely choose to operate under a nonprofit law 
that sets such standards for them. Hansmann suggests this possibil-
ity but does not develop it.44 Yet this explanation does not seem to 
justify mandatory rules - it does not explain why we should impose 
these rules on parties who would not have agreed to them on their 
merits, apart from contracting costs. The law could offer these rules 
as gapfillers, allowing parties to opt out, thereby accomplishing the 
reduction in the contracting costs of willing parties, without impos-
42. See Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 3, at 852-53. 
43. Hansmann illustrates the promises which might be required of a profit-seeking broad-
casting company: 
(1) The owners could promise that no more than, for example, five percent of the income 
they receive from all sources will be distributed to the owners as compensation and 
profits. 
(2) The owners could promise that the total amounts distributed to themselves as com-
pensation and profits will not exceed a given dollar limit. 
(3) The owners could promise that the amounts distributed to themselves will not exceed 
"reasonable" compensation for the services and capital they contribute to the 
organization. 
In each case it would need to be promised further that all amounts not distributed to the 
owners would be devoted to other expenses necessary for the production of broadcasts of 
the highest quality that those amounts permit. 
Id. at 852. 
44. See id. at 853. 
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ing the rules on others. Thus, even if we believe that the expanded 
dividend ban does solve the marginal-impact monitoring problem of 
some donors, we have not explained why it should be mandatory. 
Again, the explanation is a reduction of the state's enforcement 
costs. For the many charitable organizations dependent on a large 
number of contributors, it might be impractical to administer a sys-
tem in which the fiduciary rules governing use of the corporation's 
funds vary from dollar to dollar, depending on the agreement made 
with the contributor of that dollar. It would be far less costly for the 
government, when it takes on the monitoring burden, to enforce a 
uniform rule on all of the nonprofit corporation's funds.45 
In sum, the strict trust standards and the no-dividend rule may 
offer the donor some help with the problem created by the impossi-
bility of monitoring the marginal impact of his gift. But they will not 
eliminate that problem, and they will not even help if their enforce-
ment is left to the donor because the cost of enforcement is too high. 
It is, therefore, necessary to have that cost subsidized by the govern-
ment ifwe are to pursue this solution.46 Furthermore, we have seen 
that the principal advantage of imposing a flat ban on self-dealing, 
rather than the normal business corporation rules or a rule set by 
contract between donor and donee, is to reduce the government's 
enforcement costs. Our expansion of the contract failure theory thus 
concludes that while the argument in favor of strict standards is not 
frivolous, neither is it overwhelming.47 It helps but does not solve 
45. Hansmann also makes this point Id 
46. The advantage of the nonprofit form, then, is that it economizes on contracting and 
enforcement Under the private contractual approach, each individual patron not only 
must understand and agree to a complex contract but also must police the organization's 
finances as a whole - or rely upon other patrons to do so. Moreover, to the extent that 
patrons do engage in such policing, they may be duplicating each other's actions, since the 
activity that constitutes breach of the contract is presumably the same for all. Conse-
quently, considerable economies can be realized by placing all such transactions under 
one collective contract between the organization and its patrons: the contract determined 
by the state's nonprofit corporation law and policed by the state. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
47. Later in Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 568-69, Hansmann does offer 
some additional arguments in favor of strict standards. Their theme is that the patrons of 
nonprofit corporations lack rights ordinarily possessed by the shareholders of business corpo-
rations, and therefore, that stricter duties need to be imposed on the nonprofit's management 
to protect patron interests. The deficiencies in patron rights that Hansmann observes all flow 
from his definition of "patron," which includes all donors and customers. Members, including 
member-customers of a mutual benefit nonprofit, for example, do possess, under the law of 
most states, all of the rights that he identifies. As to such mutual-benefit nonprofits, then, his 
arguments have force only if one believes that non-member "patrons" should have a claim 
equal to that of the members to the allegiance of management I do not believe this should be 
so. For the reasons stated in Part m (B) infta, I believe that it is far preferable to ensure the 
integrity of mutual benefit nonprofits through statutory guaranties of member democracy, 
combined with definitional provisions ensuring that the organizational form is in fact used by 
customer controlled membership organizations. 
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the donor's problem. The next section supplements these arguments 
with an additional point, not grounded in the marginal-impact mon-
itoring problem. • 
2. Strict Standards as a Solicitation Strategy 
Theft or embezzlement by a pastor, a March of Dimes organizer, 
or a Salvation Army Santa Claus evokes a distinctive outrage. That 
same feeling is not generated by the self-dealing of a business corpo-
ration director, reprehensible as we may believe it is. The di.ff erence 
lies in the special insult we feel when everyday evil, which we may 
learn to watch for, sneaks up on us disguised as virtue. Indeed, it 
seems likely that most people, including donors; would be suspicious 
of high salaries for the managers of a donative nonprofit, and they 
might well object to compensating management with bonuses as a 
reward for successful fund raising. They would almost surely object 
to managers, as owners, paying themselves a dividend from revenues 
in addition to their salary. Indeed, fundraising counsel frequently 
reject, as unethical, arrangements under which their pay is calculated 
as a proportion of the funds raised, and they may well believe that 
potential donors would share that objection. People are sometimes 
even heard to say that it is objectionable for operations like nursing 
homes, hospitals, or day care centers to earn profits at all. Even if 
the donor could see the marginal impact of his gift, he might still be 
concerned about such issues. He might prefer to support a donee 
that avoided these practices even where it offered his donation no 
greater marginal impact. 
These observations suggest an additional explanation for strict 
fiduciary standards, apart· from the attempt to overcome the donor's 
difficulty in monitoring the marginal impact of his gift. Mandatory 
strict fiduciary standards and the dividend ban might be explained as 
value-based rules vindicating a widely shared moral preference. The 
advantage of such an explanation is that it requires very little ana-
lytic support; the disadvantage is that it will fail to persuade those 
who do not share the moral preference. One strength of the contract 
failure theory, if its logic were to hold up, is that it explains how such 
mandatory rules solve a problem without relying on value choices. 
Even if we believe that most people .share at least portions of this 
moral preference, it is difficult to conclude that the law should im-
pose it on all nonprofits. 
Nonetheless, the managers of a nonprofit might wish to comply 
with this moral preference as one tool in attracting gifts. That is, 
they might well take on such restrictions voluntarily. Analogous tac-
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tics for attracting business are practiced, for example, by mutual 
funds, which often voluntarily commit themselves to restri<;:tions on 
their investment discretion. They may promise to invest only in gov-
ernment bonds or only in energy stocks. We have just seen, how-
ever, that individual contracts between the nonprofit and particular 
donors might often be impractical as a method of establishing such a 
commitment since enf~rcement is so costly. Uniform rules covering 
all of the nonprofit's funds work better, especially if they are en-
forced by the government. 
In short, we see that, for reasons wholly apart from monitoring 
problems, a donor might prefer an organization with defining rules 
that bar dividends and impose strict fiduciary duties. And as indi-
cated above, the moral pref~rence for strict rules_ has distinct prac~i-
cal implications. The preference stems in part from the fear that 
self-interested acts will be disguised as charitable ones and that the 
"purity'' of the charitable sector will thus be violated. This suggests 
that, in order to preserve the advantage of the strict fiduciary rules in 
soliciting donations, it might be necessary to make them mandatory. 
For the point is to establish a label-whether "nonprofit," "charita-
ble," or "public benefit" - that serves as an easy marker whereby 
potential contributors can identify organizations that are bound to 
these standards. Accordingly, we can permit no exceptions to those 
standards for organizations that choose to use the label, for if excep-
tions are permitted, then the label's value as a marker is substantially 
reduced. It would be as if we permitted supermarkets to sell low 
quality beef with the label "prime." Such a policy would destroy the 
value of the label, even if we required the supermarkets to disclose 
their departure from the statutory "prime" standards. Under the dis-
closure rule buyers might protect themselves by carefully reading the 
package, but the label "prime" would still be rendered functionless. 
The purpose of the label is to enable buyers to decide how to spend 
their money; while we wish to offer them a range of choice that in-
cludes both prime and lesser grades of meats, we will increase the 
chances of optimal allocation by ensuring that the grades are clearly 
labeled. 
The same principle applies to organizational forms. There are, 
or should be, organization alternatives to the nonprofit charitable 
form available to the organizer who wishes to create a corporation 
with more forgiving standards. You pay your money and you take 
your choice. But the choice of an organizational form requiring the 
strictest standards, like the choice of producing prime beef, will be 
preserved only if the labels are clear, so that the organization's cus-
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tomers can be easily reached. If we wish to have the strict-standard 
organization as one alternative available to organizers, we advance 
that goal by establishing a distinctive label that only such organiza-
tions can use. In a world without contracting or monitoring costs, we 
would not need such a distinct organizational form: Standards 
analogous to those implied by the label could simply be imposed by 
contract. But since donors do face such costs, as a marketing matter 
the nonprofit charity's solicitation strategy would work better if do-
nor reliance on a label could obviate the need for complex, ad hoc 
contracts. 
Considered in this light, we can see that the strict fiduciary rules 
must be mandatory because they are defining rules. But while they 
are mandatory for this label, they are not mandatory in the usual 
sense, for they can be avoided simply by the choice of another orga-
nizational form. They are mandatory in the sense that the standards 
for "prime" beef are mandatory: Sale of choice beef is perfectly le-
gal if properly labeled. We choose to have an organizational form 
with such defining rules because those rules offer a functional advan-
tage for the organization which depends upon gifts for its sustenance. 
Such gifts might be easier to attract for two reasons. First, donors 
concerned about the marginal impact of their gifts may have that 
concern reduced. Second, an appropriately fashioned package of 
rules will respond to a moral preference that many donors may have, 
apart from the marginal impact problem. Organizers who do not 
wish their managers to be bound by such requirements, whether be-
cause they do not believe that the requirements will aid in solicita-
tion, or for any other reason, can choose a di.ff erent organizational 
form. The labels must only be clearly enough established that do-
nors will not be confused about the nature of the organization seek-
ing their support. 
It must be pointed out that the solicitation strategy argument, 
much like the marginal impact monitoring argument, does not inevi-
tably require adoption of an absolute ban on self-dealing transac-
tions, as opposed to a more limited ban on transactions unfair to the 
corporation. We are still left with the arguments on this issue sug-
gested earlier.48 It does suggest, however, that the donative non-
profit should have stricter standards than the business corporation 
since otherwise there would be no solicitation advantage. The ban 
on dividends is by itself an important difference. It may also be im-
portant to reduce the legal impact of the members' or directors' rati-
48. See text at notes 37-47 supra. 
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fl.cation of a suspect transaction since otherwise management could 
unilaterally create an exception to the implicit promise that it made 
when it solicited funds under the donative nonprofit label. This may 
be especially important since the directors of donative m;mprofits are 
typically not elected by donors, but are self-perpetuating. When we 
consider mutual benefit nonprofits, we will see that democratic pro-
cedures may well reduce the need for strict standards. 
It is sometimes said that the managers and members of a charita-
ble corporation do not "own" its assets, and this may be a useful 
conceptual device to remember in defining the difference between 
the charitable corporation and other corporate forms. The strict 
fiduciary standards flow comfortably from such a core concept; we 
are accustomed to imposing special rules on people handling other 
people's money. And in fact the people who control the charitable 
corporation traditionally do not possess many of the normal inci-
dents of ownership: They do not have unrestricted discretion con-
cerning the charitable purposes to which they can apply these 
assets,49 and they certainly cannot apply them to their own benefit.50 
But the rules themselves are the defining characteristic, rather than 
the more amorphous concept of ownership, and the drafting of those 
rules should be guided by their intended function, rather than by 
abstract deductions from the ownership concept. Their function is to 
establish an organizational alternative that is especially attractive to 
contributors who wish to promote some cause through the nonprofit 
intermediary.51 
This section has used the term "donative" nonprofits. The term 
is Hansmann's and it nicely describes the organizations dependent 
for their funds largely on gifts. Most of these organizations would 
traditionally be labeled "charitable," but the overlap is not perfect, 
and I have purposely avoided the traditional term because it con-
notes a host of hoary rules that would needlessly complicate our 
discussion. 52 
Much of the traditional law of charity will live on in the regula-
49. See, e.g., cases cited in note 37 supra & note 57 infra. 
50. See cases cited in note 22 supra. 
5 I. It has also been said that the core feature of charity is that it is not "self-regarding," but 
"other-regarding." This concept might be more descriptive than "'?wnership," and could be a 
better shorthand phrase. It captures the special tone of the charita~le corporation, and it re-
minds us why that organization is likely to require a very different legal structure than the 
business corporation. 
52. For example, there are rules regarding when a purpose is charitable. See, e.g., In re 
Shaw [1957] I W.L.R. 729; In re Shaw's Will Trusts, [1952) Ch. 163 (1951); State ex rel Grant 
v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974). 
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tions of the Internal Revenue Service. 53 These regulations will re-
quire their own policy rationale, independent of the conception of a 
corporation code advanced here. Undoubtedly, incorporated chari-
ties would choose the donative form urged here because that form 
would meet many of the specifications which the tax law indepen-
dently requires of organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible 
contributions. But some donative nonprofit corporations may not 
meet the tax law's other requirements, such as abstention from polit-
ical activities,54 while some IRS-certified charities would not fall 
within our code because they did not incorporate. There is no diffi-
culty created by this lack of congruity between the tax law and the 
corporate law, except the occasional confusion of the uninitiated. 
Indeed, confusion exists today since there are, to the layman's com-
mon surprise, many nonprofit corporations that are neither charita-
ble nor eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. 
Nonetheless, "donative" may be a misleading label if it implies 
that the organization must rely on donations. The organizational 
form should be available to any entity that wishes the package of 
rules it contains. In some cases financial contributions may not sup-
port the organization, yet its organizers may think of it as charitable 
and may wish to adopt an organizational form which conveys that 
message. For example, a group of individuals may plan to sell their 
professional services to deserving clients at favoraple rates. Their 
clients may even be other donative nonprofits. The organizers might 
wish to adopt the donative label to convey their altruistic intentions 
to potential customers. Both the label and the rules that it identifies 
are quite compatible with this purpose; these organizers in fact in-
tend to make a partial gift of their services. 
There is nothing conceptually troublesome about this result. In-
deed, some largely nondonative organizations, such as hospitals,55 
are likely to choose this form to facilitate obtaining or retaining 
favorable tax status. Although our discussion has focused on only 
one function for our package of strict rules - facilitating donations 
-it will have others as well. Those administering property tax ex-
53. For a general discussion of the Service's enforcement of traditional charitable stan-
dards as a requirement for classification as an organization eligible to receive tax-deductible 
contributions, see B. HOPKINS, supra note 10, at 38-46. 
54. The Sierra Club, for example, lost its exemption by engaging in political activity. See 
80 HARV. L. REv. 1793 (1967). The current law is somewhat different, but still places limits on 
lobbying. See B. HOPKINS, supra note 10, at 177-96; Washburn, Lobbying By Public Charil/es, 
4 TAX NOTES No. 44, at 3-12 (1976). 
55. Some have argued that hospitals should not be nonprofit corporations. See Clark, 
.Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1980). 
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emptions or special mail rates may well find that the donative pack-
age of rules conveniently describes attributes that their law requires. 
That result only increases the usefulness of having a category of or-
ganizations that everyone understands is governed by such rules, and 
such usefulness is ultimately the rationale for having a separate cate-
gory of organizations. 
3. The Importance of Separating Patrons into Buyers and Donors 
The above analysis of donative nonprofits supports some of the 
conclusions reached by Hansmann's contract failure theory: A divi-
dend ban and heightened fiduciary obligations are key features of 
the donative nonprofit, allowing it to attract gifts. In reaching that 
conclusion, however, we have focused on the donor's problem of 
monitoring the impact of his gift, which is one part of the patron's 
contract failure problem. We have not yet considered buyers or 
quality-monitoring problems. The next section offers a theory of 
mutual benefit nonprofits that suggests that they are designed to 
solve the special problems confronted by some buyers. Buyers face a 
different problem than donors, that section argues, and require an 
organizational form with different defining rules. I therefore urge a 
nonprofit law with two categories of corporations, along the lines of 
the new California code. Hansmann, however, by viewing the prob-
lem in terms of patrons and contract failure, necessarily develops a· 
unitary model - a model that contemplates one organizational 
form to handle the contract failure problems of all patrons. 
Hansmann's model has two consequences. First, it would apply 
the rules appropriate to donative nonprofits to mutual benefit non-
profits as well. This difference is discussed in the next section. Sec-
ond, he would impose on the nonprofits that I call "donative" the 
same obligations to their purchasers as to their contributors, while 
my model assumes that there are no special rules governing the rela-
tionship between a donative nonprofit and those who purchase from 
it. ' 
It might seem odd to talk of "purchasers" in the context of dona-
tive nonprofits; surely some transactions that superficially appear to 
be purchases are in fact donations. When a public television station 
asks its viewers to ''purchase" memberships, it is really asking for 
donations. There may be some quid pro quo, such as when the sta-
tion provides its members with a monthly program guide, and to that 
extent the membership fee has in fact purchased a subscription. But 
both parties to this transaction understand that the price of the mem-· 
bership is well in excess of what would be charged by a commercial, 
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profitmaking organization that simply sold a program guide; that ex-
cess is the donation. And indeed, the excess will not be the same for 
every member because, while the station may set a minimum price 
for a membership, many members will respond to pleas that they 
contribute more than the stated minimum. That same basic fund 
raising scheme has many variations: the charity ball, the $100-a-
plate dinner, the benefit concert, stamps from the tuberculosis soci-
ety, the newsletter to members. The actual source of the donation is 
not always the purchaser. In the benefit concert, for example, the 
performing group might be the real donors, volunteering their tal-
ents, while the ticket holders pay only the normal market price for 
the privilege of attending. But whenever an event is conducted by a 
donative nonprofit, the "profits" generated by any such fund raising 
scheme are donations, and they must be managed according to the 
strict standards that the corporation has voluntarily undertaken. 
Thus, these transactions are not really purchases, and they raise no 
new issues for donative nonprofits. 
Other common transactions are purchases in substance as well as 
form - purchases that have no donative element. The beneficiaries 
of a donative nonprofit's activities sometimes purchase from it. Stu-
dents pay tuition at private universities, and even scholarship stu-
dents often pay reduced amounts; soup kitchens may make a token 
charge for a meal that is largely subsidized by donations. Health 
clinics may rely on contributed funds to subsidize care for the poor, 
but may still charge patients a lowered fee. Even though the price 
may be reduced by subsidies, all of these transactions are purchases 
in the normal sense: There is a buyer whose primary interest in the 
transaction is the quid pro quo. At other times donatives make un-
subsidized sales. Museums, for example, commonly have museum 
stores that sell books, prints or other items at normal market rates; 
hospitals may operate parking lots that charge normal market rates. 
The motivations for such sales efforts vary. The museum store might 
be a source ofpro_fits that are channeled into general museum opera-
tions; the parking lot might be viewed as a necessary service to visi-
tors or employees, but one that ought to pay its own way through 
market fees. The managers' rationales may or may not make sense, 
but that does not affect our analysis.56 
The theory of donative nonprofits offered above assumes that 
contributors may be attracted by the nonprofit's structure, but it sug-
56. In fact, managers of nonprofits may well sell some services expressly to subsidize 
others. For an illuminating model of the relationship between subsidized services, profitmak-
ing services and donations, see James, supra note 38. 
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gests no similar reliance by customers. The customer, unlike the do-
nor, can see the marginal impact of his dollar. The scholarship 
student, the indigent buying subsidized health care, the opera patron 
purchasing a ticket, and the shopper at the museum store, all deal 
with the nonprofit provider just as they would deal with a business 
offering the same services. Like any customer they may be con-
cerned about the quality of the goods or services that they are buy-
ing, but this concern is protected by the contract or tort obligation 
imposed by law on any seller, nonprofit or for-profit. Neither the 
soup kitchen patron nor the indigent medical patient chooses the 
nonprofit provider because of a belief that a nonprofit organization 
offers better meals or health care. 57 The museum shop customer 
might expect to find high quality products at the shop, yet he can 
certainly inspect the product and price before buying, and would not 
ordinarily rely on the museum's nonprofit status in making a 
purchase. Before buying a ticket, the opera enthusiast will consider 
a company's general reputation, its choice of opera, and the sched-
uled performers; he will not care whether the company is nonprofit. 
Hansmann never tackles these questions, probably because they 
cannot be addressed without abandon.4ig the vocabulary of "pa-
trons" and "contract failure" to which he is committed. When 
Hansmann concludes that patrons should have standing to sue for 
violations of his mandatory fiduciary standards, he necessarily in-
cludes both donors and purchasers. Suits could, therefore, be 
brought not just by donors, who contributed in reliance on such stan-
dards, but also by students paying tuition, soup kitchen diners who 
made a token payment for their meal, and those who purchased 
items from the museum shop. 58 The theory extends standing to all 
patrons because it focuses on the patron-management relationship, 
57. Of course, both the soup kitchen and the clinic physician will operate under normal 
tort obligations to their customers, who effectively demand some minimal level of quality. 
Moreover, it may be that in soliciting donations, such organizations might make further repre-
sentations concerning the quality or nature of their service, to which they will then be bound. 
For example, an organization that has received donations under a trust instrument requiring it 
to operate a museum must do so, and cannot satisfy its trust purpose by limiting its expendi-
tures to running an art school Commonwealth v. Barnes Foundation, 398 Pa. 458, 159 A.2d 
500 (1960). As a result of its obligations to its. donors, such an organization must make its 
collection available to public view for at least some minimal period. If the museum limits 
public access too severely, it will violate its duties to its contributors, but under traditional law, 
there would be no duties to "customers" or "patrons" that would be violated. 
58. Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 606-11. Hansmann observes that customers 
as well as donors are included in his argument for patron standing, but he is content with the 
observation that ''the interests of customers appear to have most in common with those of 
donors [rather than beneficiaries]." Id. at 608-09. 
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without distinguishing between contributor-patrons and purchaser-
patrons. 
Hansmann separately argues that the beneficiaries of a non-
profit's activities ought to have standing, even when they are not pa-
trons and are therefore not part of the group to which he thinks 
duties are owed.59 Proposals to allow standing to a charity's benefi-
ciaries have been made in the past, with no particular success. 60 But 
whether or not one agrees with the argument, it is offered apart from 
the basic theory and does not purport to change the substance of the 
duties to be enforced. For Hansmann, that means that although the 
soup kitchen diner who gets his meal free will have standing to sue, 
duties are owed only to those diners making a token payment for 
their meal. The nonpatron beneficiary could thus argue-that man-
agement had failed in its obligations to those who paid for their 
meals, but could not argue that they failed in their duty to those, like 
him, who received their meals free. This artificial distinction be-
tween beneficiaries results from the "patron" concept. 
The aggregation of donors and buyers as "patrons" conceals logi-
cal gaps in the contract failure argument. Hansmann argues, for ex-
ample, that museums are appropriately nonprofit because donors 
experience contract failure,61 but never addresses whether the mu-
seum's nondonor customers are also captured by this rationale. Yet 
customers are patrons by definition, and Hansmann therefore pro-
ceeds to discuss the "difficulties" raised when the management uses 
museum shop revenues to subsidize other museum operations. 62 His 
discussion is based on the unexamined premise that the shop cus-
tomer is also a "patron" to whom management owes special obliga.-
tions, and that these obligations are violated by such "cross-
subsidization." He ultim~tely avoids this awkward result by con-
structing a somewhat belabored theory of informed consent by the 
shop customer. The simpler explanation of why such museum prac-
tices do not ordinarily violate a nonprofit's heightened duties is that 
those duties do not run to the benefit of shop patrons. Patrons are 
ordinary customers who purchase without any reliance on the mu-
seum's nonprofit status. Either they are willing to pay the posted 
price for a print or a book, or they are not; if they buy the book, the 
marginal impact of their purchase is obvious. Hansmann's problem 
59. Id. at 611. 
60. Price, Stale Arts Co1111cils: Some Items far a New Agenda, 27 HAsTINOS L.J. 1183, 
1192-94. 
61. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 3, at 857-59. 
62. Nonprofit Corporal/on Law, supra note 3, at 562-63. 
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with shop customers arises only because his focus on the "patrons" 
blurs the critical distinction between a donative nonprofit's relation-
ships with its contributors and with its purchasers. 63 
Establishing a duty to the customers of a donative nonprofit 
would require a dramatic alteration of existing practices. Consider 
the "problem" of c;ross-subsidization in hospital care, which 
Hansmann explicitly addresses.64 Because he views hospital patients 
as "patrons," he asks whether hospital management violates special 
duties owed to its patients when it subsidizes the services it provides 
to some patients with revenues it obtains from others. He finds that 
such a pricing policy violates the hospital's duties to the 
"overcharged" patients, unless the hospital proves that the policy is 
"in the overall best interests of the patrons as a class."65 
Such a rule barring cross-subsidization, derived from the posited 
duty to customers, would have broad impact. Estelle James points 
out that cross-subsidization is an important and pervasive source -0f 
income for nonprofits.66 James _has shown that many universities 
regularly earn a profit on undergradute education, which they use to 
63. Ifin fact a significant number of purchasers from, as opposed to donors to, a nonprofit 
also relied on the nonprofit form to overcome "contract failure," then perhaps it would make 
sense to fashion the rules with them in mind and not worry about the minority of cases in 
which these protections were not needed. In fact, however, Hansmann offers no example of a 
dona~ve nonprofit for which such customer reliance commonly occurs. 
64. Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 560-61. 
65. Id. at 562. This assertion is also qualified by the phrase "[i]n the absence of knowledge 
or effective choice on the part of patrons." Id Hansmann does not explore in any detail how 
such a legal test would work in practice - that is to say, who would have to prove what sort of 
facts to demonstrate exemption from the usual rule by virtue of the patron's ''knowledge or 
effective choice." Apparently, however, he does not view this exception as being of particular 
comfort to hospitals, since he observes that patients do not ordinarily have effective choice and 
that "[w)hether the cross-subsidization currently undertaken by nonprofit hospitals can pass 
this test remains open to dispute." Id. (footnote omitted). It is also possible that Hansmann 
intends his rule to protect only patrons charged more than their costs, although the difficulty of 
allocating the many fixed costs of hospital care may make such distinctions irrelevant. 
I am assuming that Hansmann's required showing - "overall best interests of the patrons 
as a class" - would in practice require a demonstration that all patients benefit from the 
subsidization policy. To require only a showing that the subsidized patients benefit would 
seem to rob the rule of any function. In theory it might be possible to accept a showing that 
total benefits to all patients have increased, even though those benefits flow entirely to the 
subsidized patients - e.g., that we have conferred on patient class A total benefits worth X 
dollars, even though the increased _cost imposed (by way of subsidization) on the remaining 
patients totals only X/2. But while economists can easily think in those terms, it is difficult to 
frame workable legal rules that would, for example, justify subsidizing Patient A's kidney 
dialysis only on a showing that the value ofsavingA's life exceeds that of the increased health 
Patient B would have enjoyed from additional procedures that could have been provided B 
had part of his payments not gone to subsidizing A. 
66. Many of the examples in this paragraph are in fact borrowed from James, supra note 
38. 
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subsidize research and graduate education. 67 The Metropolitan Op-
era uses the profit on its ballet productions to subsidize its opera. 
Many colleges use the profits from their football programs to subsi-
dize other university athletic events. The University of Texas sells 
oil, and the New York University Law School at one time owned a 
successful, profitmaking noodle factory. Some donative nonprofits, 
including universities, own real estate that produces profits from 
sales or rentals. National Public Radio plans to raise money by sell-
ing recordings of its programs and transmitting business information 
by satellite communication. Undergraduates, ballet and football 
fans, oil companies, noodle eaters, and the rest are all patrons with a 
claim against nonprofit managers under the contract failure theory. 
Perhaps here, as with the museum store, it will be possible to con-
struct some defense to these potential claims, but one must ask 
whether Hansmann's definition of the nonprofits' duties, on which 
these prima facie claims are grounded, makes sense in the first place. 
Is there any reason to create a special duty of nonprofits to their 
customers? 
One reason to bar cross-subsidization, if not to have a more gen-
eral rule creating special duties to customers, is the belief that cross-
subsidization produces an economically inefficient result. That is, 
insofar as the cross-subsidization causes some goods to be overpriced 
and others underpriced, relative to the prices that would be set by a 
profit-maximizine firm in a competitive market, then there may be 
overproduction and overconsumption of the cheap goods, and un-
derproduction and underconsumption of the expensive ones. 68 Yet 
donative nonprofits are often created to subsidize, and hence "over-
produce," some goods because the market alone would fail to gener-
ate sufficient supply. Donors give to the Metropolitan Opera to 
increase opera production and consumption, in the belief that opera 
cannot otherwise ''pay its own way'' - that is, in the belief that a 
profit-making company would produce very little opera since it 
would have to charge an admission price that would ensure very lit-
tle demand. In some cases, as Hansmann has pointed out, the mar-
ket will underproduce because the goods are public goods for which 
market mechanisms do not work.69 University research may be such 
a good, so that even if more research is produced than donors paid 
67. James, Product Mix and Cost .Disaggregation: A. Reinterpretation of tlte Economics of 
Higher Education, 13 J. HUMAN REsoURCES 157 (1978). 
68. W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 442-
50 (1972). 
69. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 3, at 848-51. 
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for, there may still be less than would be produced in a perfect world 
operating without market distortions. Thus, it may be difficult to 
know when such a good is being underpriced and overproduced -
when, for example, an opera is producing too many shows, or a uni-
versity is doing ''too much" research. The consumers of the operas 
and research, of course, will never think there is too much. The do-
nor will be concerned about underproduction of the product or serv-
ice he sought to support, not about overproduction. If he has any 
concern, it is that his donation will be used to support production of 
a different product or service than the one he intended. 70 In sum, 
overproduction itself is not a problem, but it could become one if it 
were achieved with profits obtained by overpricing and under-
producing another good. 
It is easier to consider overcharge and underproduction a prob-
lem since in that case potential customers are not served despite their 
willingness to pay an economically adequate price for the product. 
Yet the fact that a nonprofit is earning profits on some of its custom-
ers does not necessarily mean that it is overcharging them in this 
economic sense, for a profit-maximizing firm in a perfectly competi-
tive market would also earn a return on equity capital in selling the 
same goods to the same customers. An overcharge, and underpro-
duction, will occur only if the nonprofit has sufficient market power 
to earn additional return by charging more, and producing less, than 
would a firm in a competitive market. Yet there seems, in general, to 
be no reason to assume that nonprofits, as a class, are more likely 
than businesses to possess such market power. We may conclude 
that nonprofit sellers ought to be subjected to the same antitrust rules 
as for-profit sellers, but we have no reason, as a matter of economic 
efficiency, to create special rules to eliminate cross-subsidization in 
nonprofits, as opposed to for-profits. That is, we have no reason, as a 
matter of economic policy, to impose on nonprofits any duty that we 
would not impose on for-profits. 
Yet perhaps we have some persuasive reason, apart from eco-
nomic efficiency, to impose special rules on nonprofit sellers, rules 
that might restrict or limit their profit making regardless of whether 
they earn monopoly profits. Some nonprofit institutions, for exam-
70. The !lonor may impose an explicit condition on the use of his gift. Such understand-
ings are normally enforceable under charitable trust law, even though it is sometimes said that 
technically the restriction does not itself create a trust. The leading case in this area is St. 
Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E.2d 305 (1939). Recent cases include: In re 
Estate of Criswell, 20 Ariz. App. 157, 510 P.2d 1062 (1973); Lefkowitz v. Cornell Univ., 35 
A.D.2d 166, 316 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1970), affd, 28 N.Y.2d 876, 271 N.E.2d 552, 322 N.Y.S.2d 717 
(1971). See 4 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348.1 (3d ed. 1967). 
1030 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:999 
ple, are given tax exemptions arguably premised on assumptions in-
consistent with their pro:fitmaking activities. Such an analysis 
partially explains the enactment of the Unrelated Business Income 
Tax.71 But even if there are remaining problems with the income 
tax, or with property taxes, these problems do not imply any particu-
lar result in constructing a theory of nonprofit corporation law be-
cause these tax exemptions are not conferred by the nonprofit 
corporation law and are not enjoyed uniformly by all nonprofits. To 
the e~tent that the tax laws do not set the proper criteria for exemp-
tions, they, and not the nonprofit laws, should be amended. The 
same argument applies to other privileges occasionally granted to 
some nonprofits, whether it be special mail rates or the right to con-
duct bingo games. 
One may, however, also be ~ncerned that the nonpro:fit's cus-
tomers are misled by the seller's nonprofit structure into believing 
that it earns no profits. This reliance, one could argue, should be 
protected by ensuring not merely that monopoly profits are not 
earned, but that no profits are earned. But this potential concern 
seems factually incorrect. As argued earlier, it seems unlikely that 
buyers who can inspect the product and who know its price really 
base their purchases on beliefs about the seller's corporate structure. 
More fundamentally, the question is whether the law ought to en-
courage oi: discourage such reliance by the customers of donative 
nonprofits. We must ask whether there is some societal need for a 
form of organization that not only bars dividends and imposes strict 
:fiduciary rules on management, but also requires management to 
forego earning any profits from sales, at least in the absence of spe-
cial justifying facts. Would such a set of defining rules describe an 
organizational form that society needs? 
Since we have never had such an organizational form, it is diffi-
cult to know for certain, but the very absence of it suggests that there 
is no need. Nor does the contract failure theory offer much convinc-
ing argument to the contrary, given the absence of any evidence that 
purchasers from donative nonprofits experience unusual monitoring 
or contracting costs. Indeed, the scarcity of any examples of abuse 
that would be cured by imposing such an additional restraint on 
nonprofits suggests that its benefits would be outweighed by the costs 
of enforcement alone, without considering the impact on revenues of 
71. This provision imposes an income tax on the earnings of otherwise exempt organiza-
tions, insofar as the earnings arc derived from an active business which is unrelated to the 
organization's exempt purpose. I.R.C. § 50l(b). See also B. HOPKINS, supra note 10, at 554-
601 (3d ed. 1979); Myers, Taxing tlte Colleges, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 368 (1953). . 
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a ban on profits.72 Any rule against cross-subsidization invites end-
less litigation to establish the "cost" of producing the different prod-
ucts that a particular nonprofit might sell; in many cases there will be 
joint production, rendering cost allocation essentially arbitrary.73 At 
a minimum, such a rule would impose considerable recordkeeping 
costs on nonprofits seeking to avoid, or a least successfully defend, 
potential suits. 
In sum, imposing on donative nonprofits a duty to their custom-
ers invites much mischief with no compensating benefit. The dona-
tive nonprofit corporation, with its no-dividend rule and heightened 
fiduciary obligations, is aptly designed to encourage gifts and, there-
fore, to pursue activities for which donative support is available. Al-
though its defining rules are designed to appeal to donors, we have 
also seen a variety of reasons, extraneous to the analysis offered here, 
why some organizations that do not rely on gift income may 
nonetheless find it useful voluntarily to adopt the donative nonprofit 
form.74 While we have rejected the proposition that the donative 
nonprofit should have defining rules structured to provide special 
benefits to its customers as well, there is in fact a need for a form of 
organization that is particularly sensitive to and controlled by its cus-
tomers. The mutual benefit nonprofit is such an organization. 
B. Mutual Benefit Nonprofits 
This section develops a rationale for creating a separate category 
of nonprofit, the mutual benefit nonprofit corporation. That ration-
ale is first outlined in the context of a nonprofit child care facility, 
and is then applied to two other typical mutual benefit nonprofits, 
the trade association and the social club. 
72. The only example of abuse provided by Hansmann is the hospital.· Hospital pricing 
policies have, in fact, drawn repeated attention and criticism. See Clark, supra note 55 and 
studies cited therein. However, hospitals may well be a special case. In the usual hospital 
transaction, the seller, chosen by the doctor, provides a service to the patient, which is paid foi: 
by an insurer (which may be the government). This separation of decision-maker, consumer, 
and payor may be unique, and clearly reduces the market's discipline of the seller's prices. 
The fact that Hansmann offers no other example of potentially objectionable cross-subsidiza-
tion in nonprofits further suggests that the problem is peculiar to the distortions created by the 
market for hospital services. If that is the problem, it should be treated by a rule applying to 
all hospitals, whether profit or nonprofit, rather than by a rule applying to all nonprofits, 
whether hospital or nonhospital. · 
73. A. ALCHIAN & w. ALLEN, ExCHANGE AND PRODUCI"ION: COMPErmoN, COORDINA-
TION AND CONTROL 256 (2d ed. 1977). 
14. See text at notes 54-55 supra. 
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1. The Child Care Facility and Its Implications far the Law of 
Mutual Benefits. 
Child care facilities are provided by the government, businesses, 
and nonprofit organizations. Government child care programs, and 
some nonprofit programs, provide below-cost services to targeted 
groups. Since such programs cannot be supported by the fees col-
lected from participating parents, they must rely on either private 
donations or government grants. As a result these child care facili-
ties are ordinarily organized as donative nonprofits to facilitate at-
tracting the necessary donations or grants. Such a child care facility, 
like a· health care facility for indigents, may yet charge some fees, 
and both its parent-participants and donors may thus be "patrons" 
under the contract failure analysis. For the reasons offered in the 
previous section, I believe that this conception is a mistake, and that 
a donative child care facility has neither a greater nor a lesser obliga-
tion to its parent-purchasers than does its for-pro.fit competitor. The 
same analysis would, of course, suggest that the donative child care 
facility has special obligations to the donors who relied on its non-
profit status. 
Next, consider unsubsidized child care facilities that do not re-
ceive donations or government grants and are supported principally, 
if not exclusively, by the funds or efforts of the parents who use the 
service. Many facilities are for-pro.fit businesses, yet some are non-
. pro.fit. The puzzle is in understanding why one would organize such 
a nonprofit, which foregoes investors' equity and which, by assump-
tion, receives no gifts. The answer, developed below, is that such 
nonprofits exist because their customers are willing to provide their 
needs, whether through higher prices (as in many social or athletic 
clubs) or volunteer labor (as in other social clubs and some child 
care facilities) in return for what they see as a special product. 
Before developing the argument fully, we should consider 
whether the contract failure theory can explain the existence of such 
nonprofit child care facilities. Hansmann's discussion of child care 
in fact focuses on the needs of parent purchasers and not those of the 
donors, and so it appears that he has the nondonative nonprofit in 
mind when he discusses nonprofit child care.75 He explains non-
profit child care by arguing that it fills the needs of parents who ex-
perience contract failure when dealing with for-profit providers. 
And just as in his discussion of CARE, he argues that the nonprofit 
15. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 3, at 865; Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 
506. 
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organization can satisfy that need only if it adheres to his expanded 
no-dividend rule. 
According to Hansmann, contract failure arises because parents 
have trouble determining whether the child care facility is doing a 
good job. Parents, like donors to CARE, cannot adequately monitor 
the nonprofit's performance; and therefore they would prefer to rely 
on a nonprofit agency whose structural attributes reassure them that 
the organization is doing its job. Parent-purchasers, like CARE do-
nors, are ''.patrons" battling high monitoring costs. In this case, how-
ever, the problem must be in monitoring the quality of the service 
provided. Clearly the parents have no difficulty in seeing the margi-
nal impact of their purchase - their child is admitted to the nursery. 
This explanation is doubly defective: There _is in fact no quality-
monitoring problem, and if there were, strict fiduciary standards 
would not solve it. Consider first whether parents find it difficult to 
evaluate performance. When a number of people rate the same 
child care program differently, their disagreement may result from 
different views on child care methods, not from inadequate informa-
tion concerning which methods the agency in question employs. In 
fact, one's general impression is that, whether or not they are right, 
parents tend to think that they know whether their child's school or 
day care facility is doing a good job. Indeed, they often have strong 
views on the subject; almost everyone has heard parents describe the 
shortcomings of their child's school. 
This general impression is supported by data recently collected 
by Jamie Newton in San Francisco, who found that a substantial 
majority of child care purchasers thought that it was very easy or 
moderately easy to judge the program's quality.76 Moreover, 
Newton found that when asked to rate a variety of attributes, users 
placed a program's status as a nonprofit or for-profit organization as 
the least important of all the listed attributes. This result makes 
sense if one assumes that parents believe they can evaluate child care 
programs. For the buyer of child care, like the buyer of pencils, the 
only question is whether the seller offers a satisfactory service at a 
satisfactory price. Since child care purchasers believe that they 
know the service, and do know the price, abstract attributes like 
whether the organization is nonprofit are unlikely to weigh heavily, 
76. The data reported here were presented by Jamie Newton at a seminar given in the 
Spring of 1981 at the Program on Nonprofit Institutions, Institution for Social and Policy 
Studies, Yale University. The data are part of a study that will ultimately be published, but 
until that time interested readers can obtain further information directly from Newton at San 
Francisco State University, Department of Psychology. 
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unless the potential buyer believes that price or quality will be af-
fected by the attribute. Some respondents to Newton's questionnaire 
might have equated "nonprofit" wiili; "charitable," and to the extent 
that he or she considered it at all, might have assumed that a non-
profit agency would charge less. 
Hansmann's explanation, however, assumes that some parents 
will choose a nonprofit because it offers higher quality, rather than a 
better price; the superior quality would be due to the expanded no-
dividend nile. And here we get to the second defect in this contract 
failure explanation: Even if one agrees that parents have difficulty 
evaluating a child care program, high .fiduciary standards will not 
solve their problem. For those standards deal only with .financial 
failings by managers, which is not the parental concern assumed by 
the contract failure model. The model instead made the more plau-
sible assumption that parents were concerned mainly with the quali-
ty' of child care. Expanding the scope of .fiduciary obligations 
beyond .financial irregularities to include other concerns, such as 
whether the nursery school managers were careless in their decision 
to use Montessori methods, would transform. and complicate tradi-
tional law quite dramatically, and Hansmann never commits himself 
to a proposal that sweeping. The strict .fiduciary rules serve the do-
nor concerned about marginal-impact monitoring, but not the buyer 
concerned about quality monitoring. 
The contract failure theory does suggest one indirect connection 
between the standards it would impose and the quality-monitoring 
problem: that the owner of a for-pro.fit facility may spend less 
money on care than will the management of a nonprofit. But unless 
the nonprofit is subsidized with gift income, this is implausible. 
Most of the nonpro.fit's expenses will be the same; labor, rent and 
equipment cost the nonprofit as much as the for-pro.fit facility. If it 
plans to seek gifts, it should be a donative, and thus adopt the strict 
standards; but even if it does attract gifts and has more money to 
spend on care, the parents' quality-monitoring problems persist. The 
nonprofit might spend more per child on care, but do so in ways that 
the potential parent-purchaser does not believe yield better care. 
For example, it might buy more expensive toys, but ones that the 
parent thinks are undesirable; it might pay its staff more, yet choose 
staff with a child care philosophy that the parent opposes. In sum, 
the heightened .fiduciary obligations called for by the contract failure 
model do not serve the needs of parent-purchasers. 
It thus seems that by collapsing donors and purchasers into one 
category Hansmann has designed a theory that does not respond to 
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the needs of purchasers. Donors may be attracted by a recipient's 
commitment to strict standards, for the reasons explaine4 earlier. 
But a purchaser, whether of child care services or automobiles, ordi-
narily could not care less. If management can pay itself ten times the 
standard salary while offering an attractive product at an attractive 
price, there will be satisfied purchasers. 77 The rules appropriate for a 
donative nonprofit thus appear to offer very little to attract customers 
to a nonprofit that relies principally on sales, rather than donations. 
Why then would parents organize a mutual benefit child care 
agency? The answer is control of the service-provider by its consum-
ers. In the mutual benefit child care facility, for example, voting 
control over management would be placed in the parents themselves. 
The facility would be owned by the parent-customers, and they 
might even take turns managing the operation. Few parents would 
be enthusiastic a,bout donating their time so that a for-profit proprie-
tor could increase his earnings, but many may donate their time to a 
parent-run facility. When the value of their time is considered, they 
may in fact pay a high price for the care, but they will do so to 
purchase control. 
Customer control might be especially important in a service like 
child care for three related reasons. First, the consumer is more inti-
mately concerned with the quality of the product and will expend 
effort to obtain exactly what he wants. This is amplified by the fact 
that the purchase is a continuing one, perhaps made daily. Finally, 
although quality monitoring may not seem difficult, the contracting 
cost may be high. Those who manage the child care facility wµI 
make daily decisions that concern the purchaser and influence his 
view of the product's quality. Yet it would be difficult for the buyer 
to specify his preferences in advance, both because it would be ad-
ministratively tedious to spell out such detail in a contract and be-
cause the specific issues are difficult to anticipate. What the buyer 
really wants are managers with good judgment and compatible val-
ues. While there may be no "contract failure" in the sense of diffi-
culty in evaluating performance, there are severe problems with 
attempting to write a contract to handle the situation. But this sort 
77. There are circumstances in which buyers appear to care about the size of a seller's 
profits, but these occur principally when the buyer has no choice of seller. If the buyer is 
purchasing child care from a monopolist, he may well prefer a monopolist restricted by fiduci-
ary rules limiting his profits, just as he prefers to have utilities regulated to limit returns. Child 
care, however, is rarely sold by firms with monopoly power, and so long as the buyer has a 
choice in purchasing child care, he will focus on the product and its price rather than the 
seller's profits. Objections to the profits generated by competitive nurseries seem no more likely 
than objections to the profits generated by the sellers of pet rocks. 
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of problem is not special to the nonprofit world; it exists as well in 
commercial settings.78 It is thus clear that such contracting problems 
cannot serve as the single overriding explanation for mutual benefit 
nonprofits. But perhaps, in combination with the other two factors, 
it helps explain why the mutual benefit nonprofit form has arisen.79 
Parents' choice of the nonprofit corporation form for child care 
facilities would not be surprising. A mutual benefit organization will 
often begin as an informal association. An attorney asked to incor-
porate it will normally choose the nonprofit form since memberships 
and directorships can easily be arranged to lodge control in the par-
ticipating parents. Membership in a nonprofit can cease when the 
child ceases attending, whereas the "members" of a business corpo-
ration are its shareholders, and withdrawal requires forfeiture of 
business corporation shares. so Memberships in a nonprofit can be 
made nontransferable without becoming entangled in the special 
provisions of a business corporation law concerning share transfera-
bility, which were drafted with a concern for financial problems not 
relevant here. Members can be expelled if they prove to be trouble-
some as participants in the group enterprise, whether because of con-
flicts in personality or differences in child care philosophy.81 Finally, 
the no-dividend rule, while unlikely to be a major concern to the 
organizers, in fact seems to be quite appropriate. The only purpose 
of a dividend is to reward those who provide equity capital. Yet the 
very point of a parent-run nonprofit child care facility is that it is 
owned not by nonparticipants, but by the parents, and they wish to 
discourage ownership by nonparent investors who have only a 
financial interest. Easily negotiable, dividend-issuing equity shares, 
therefore, would be inappropriate since they would have no purpose 
but to facilitate ownership by the very class of persons the organiza-
tion was formed to avoid. 
Nor does a bar on cash dividends create any real problems for 
18. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 61 VA, L. REV. 1089 (1981), and 
articles cited therein. 
79. The great number of for-profit child care facilities demonstrates that many parents are 
not motivated by these concerns to pursue the nonprofit alternative. But for our purposes all 
that matters is that some are so motivated, and that they find the nonprofit form a convenient 
organizational structure by which to achieve their goal. 
80. There may also be other advantages to the nonprofit form as a result of other laws. For 
example, in some states any nonprofit corporation, including mutual benefit nonprofit corpora-
tions, will be charged lower filing fees than business corporations, and may be exempt from 
minimum corporation taxes. These are not structural attributes of the nonprofit form, how-
ever, and therefore do not concern us here. 
81. There is of course a rich literature on the subject of expulsions, and there is no doubt 
that the law will require at least certain procedural protections for members being expelled. 
See note 15, supra. 
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the parent-owners. It simply means that any surplus must be used to 
improve services or to reduce fees, either of which is entire}y consis-
tent with the parents' purposes in creating or joining the nonprofit 
corporation. The effect of the simple no-dividend rule in this form 
of nonprofit is to require that any earnings be paid out to members 
"in kind," in the form of child care services. 
But while mutual benefits share the no-dividend rule with dona-
tive nonprofits, that common feature is not nearly as central as the 
contract failure thesis suggests because each category requires the 
no-dividend rule for entirely different reasons. For the donatives it 
is merely one part of a larger group of rules barring financially self-
interested transactions; the purpose is to attract and protect contribu-
tors. For the mutual benefits it is appropriately part of a package of 
rules ensuring control by the corporation's customers, which is the 
mutual benefits' raison d'~tre. Thus, just as strict fiduciary rules are 
the defining rules for donatives, rules designed to ensure customer 
control are the defining rules for mutual benefits. Apart from a ban 
on dividends, two additional groups of rules are required to ensure 
customer control. These rules would apply to the full range of mu-
tual benefit nonprofits, including social clubs and trade associations. 
The first rule is fairly simple: The law should require that some 
minimum percentage of a mutual benefit's revenue be derived from 
its members. This is probably the most central defining rule, for it 
alone ensures that the ultimate governing authority, the member-
ship, includes at least a majority of the mutual benefit organization's 
customers. 82 Any mutual benefit organization might want at times 
82. While nonprofit laws now do not contain such restrictions, in at least two cases courts 
have in fact found it necessary to create judge-made rules to deal with the problems created by 
a conflict between investor-members and customer-members of mutual benefit nonprofits. In 
Aliberti v. Green, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 372 N.E.2d 534 (1978), a countty club was formed by 
creating both a business corporation, which purchased the land, and a nonprofit, which leased 
the land and operated the club. Each member of the club was necessarily a member of the 
nonprofit corporation, and at first each member was also required to purchase a share in the 
sister business corporation. Over time, however, some shareholders dropped out of the club, 
while some persons were admitted to membership in the club without purchasing a share of 
the business corporation. Club members, however, still held a clear majority of the shares and 
therefore controlled the board of the business corporation. The minority nonmember share-
holders brought an action alleging that the board had made decisions sacrificing the corpora-
tion's financial interests for the benefit of the club. While such a claim by a minority 
shareholder would ordinarily be actionable, the court sustained a summary judgment for the 
defendant board because their conduct had been approved by the shareholders. While con-
ceding that the majority shareholders' vote was not disinterested, the court noted that in reality 
these two separate corporations were created ''for one common purpose." 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 
45, 372 N.E.2d at 538. See also Beaver Lake Assn. v. Beaver Lake Corp., 200 Neb. 685, 264 
N.W.2d 871 (1978), a similar case involving two corporations, one a nonprofit homeowners 
association, the other a for-profit business corporation which acted as the developer. The court 
found that, although not specifically barred by any nonprofit law, the business corporation's 
continued domination of the Association's board (it appointed four of seven members), al-
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to sell its services to some nonmembers, whether as trial members, as 
guests of members, or to accommodate transients. But if its custom-
ers are not predominantly its membership, it loses its character as a 
mutual benefit nonprofit corporation. There is, of course, nothing 
wrong with one group of people forming a corporation to provide a 
service for another, but that is not a mutual benefit corporation; it is 
a business corporation. The proposed rule would be inappropriate 
for a donative nonprofit corporation, which might noi sell services at 
all. Nor do we wish to make the management of a donative non-
profit responsible principally to those who buy services from it. But 
that is precisely the purpose of a mutual benefit nonprofit. 
This proposed rule would eliminate from the nonprofit world a 
number of existing forms of nonprofit. There are, for example, non~ 
profit consulting companies, controlled by key employee-members, 
which sell their professional time like any for-profit consulting com-
pany. 83 They often have a research aura about them, although in 
fact they do little or no research beyond that needed to fulfill their 
consulting contracts. They neither are nor attempt to be donative 
nonprofits. They do not rely on gifts. They do not apply for federal 
tax status as a charitable enterprise, and they would have no reason 
to choose our donative nonprofit law and thereby to subject them-
selves to heightened fiduciary duties and attorney general supervi-
siqn. As Hansmann has pointed out, since these consulting 
companies often make no attempt to qualify as charities, they are not 
usually subject to the traditional charitable trust rules. 84 Clark has 
observed that hospitals might choose the nonprofit form principally 
to trade, misleadingly, on the label "nonprofit,"85 and the same ex-
planation could apply to such consulting companies. 
Of course, a model law grounded on the theory advanced here 
would permit the organizers of such a consulting company to choose 
the nonprofit form if they found its rules appropriate for them. And 
lowing it to advance its private financial interests at the Association's expense, was "against 
public policy." 200 Neb. at 690-92, 264 N.W.2d at 875. 
These cases illustrate the inevitable conflicts between investors and member-customers. 
The same board cannot have duties to both because such duties will inevitably conflict, much 
as there might be a conflict between the interests of contributors to and customers of a dona• 
tive nonprofit The solution is to clarify at the outset to which group the governing board is 
obligated: contributors (donative nonprofit corporation), customers (mutual benefit nonprofit 
corporation), or investors (business corporation). The rule advanced in the text serves this 
purpose by ensuring that any organization that calls itself a mutual benefit nonprofit corpora-
tion is in fact controlled by its customers. 
83. See A. NAIRN & Assocs., THE REloN OF ETS 40-41, 294-370 (1980); 17te Pleasures of 
Nonprojilability, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1976, at 89. 
84. Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 585-86. 
85. Clark, supra note 55, at 1441-47. 
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some might well choose the donative nonprofit structure. For exam-
ple, we noted above that a group of professionals who intended to 
make their services available to worthy· projects at bargain rates 
might wish to use the nonprofit form to communicate their inten-
tions to potential customers. The fiduciary rules associated with the 
donative nonprofit form would be quite consistent with this plan. 
All that the model advanced here would require is that, if they seek 
the nonprofit form, they adopt either such strict fiduciary duties or 
customer control. If they intend instead to engage in a joint enter-
prise to generate profits from the sale of their services, they should be 
a partnership or business corpora_tion. Yet current law in fact allows 
the choice of the nonprofit form for this purpose, by virtue of its 
accommodating structure. 
These companies are actually closely held business corporations, 
operating as nonprofits. As nonprofits, they cannot issue dividends, 
but they have no desire to do so. Like any closely held business 
corporation, they prefer to pay out their earnings in compensation 
and perquisites. In most cases the resulting harm is merely confu-
sion: While some additional customers might be obtained through 
this subterfuge, it seems unlikely that many would stay if they could 
get a better deal from a for-profit competitor. Nonetheless, as we 
saw earlier, there is value in having standardized labels, so that peo-
ple can easily identify the nature of the organzation with which they 
are dealing. 86 
There is another benefit to insisting that only true mutual benefits 
may use the label: clarifying the rules by which to decide internal 
disputes. By adopting a nonprofit form, the consulting company's 
organizers have placed themselves in a potentially awkward position 
in the event of a falling out, for their organization is in reality a 
business partnership. Both partnership law and business corporation 
law have well-developed rules by which business disputes can be ad-
judicated, but the nonprofit law is neither as well-developed, nor is it 
generated with such disputes in mind. The result is that a court 
asked to resolve their dispute will either use nonprofit principles 
drawn from social clubs, under which expulsions are generally per-
86. A recent pilot study suggests that there is considerable public confusion as to the mean-
ing of ''nonprofit." Respondents to the study had considerable difficulty distinguishing for-
profit from nonprofit corporations. Only 34% of the respondents, drawn from the New Haven 
area, knew that the Yale-New Haven Hospital was nonprofit, and only 24% knew that Yale 
University itself was nonprofit. Fifty-nine percent thought Yale was a for-profit institution, 
while 18% did not know whether Yale was for-profit or nonprofit. There was similar confusion 
as to whether nonprofits offered potential customers higher quality service. Permut, Consumer 
Perceptions of NonprojiJ Enterprise, 90 YALE LJ. 1623 (1981). 
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mitted, without compensation, so long as fair procedures are used, or 
it will engraft more appropriate rules, drawn from the business con-
text, onto the nonprofit law. The former course is likely to produce 
an inappropriate result. The latter will confuse the law of nonprofits. 
This entire difficulty would be avoided by the rule advanced here, 
which would push business organizations into the legal forms de-
signed for them. 
These difficulties, moreover, are avoided at no costs, so long as 
every legitimate activity has an appropriate organizational form 
available to it. Under the rules advanced here, the consulting com-
pany could be formed as a partnership or a business corporation if 
its purpose were to make money for its organizers, as a donative 
nonprofit if it wanted to undertake strict fiduciary standards and At-
torney General supervision, or as a mutual benefit if it planned, like 
the College Entrance Examination Board, to serve an identified and 
relatively stable set of customers who desired joint control over it. 
One more step is necessary to complete our defining rules: We 
must ensure that the members actually control the corporation, for 
otherwise it will not be a true mutual benefit corporation. In general 
it is preferable to let the parties themselves specify the details of their 
arrangements, but because it is so fundamental to the character of a 
mutual benefit corporation, the code should guarantee some mini-
mal level of member democracy. · 
Code guarantees of internal democracy are much more impor-
tant to the mutual benefit corporation than to the business corpora-
tion. In the small, closely-held business corporation there is likely to 
be the equivalent of a partnership agreement, detailing the relation-
ship between the parties and protecting their interests. Because 
financial stakes are involved, the agreement will have been drafted 
with some care by an attorney or by a number of attorneys repre-
senting the various parties. In such a situation, the agreement would 
diminish the need for statutory rules. In the large business corpora-
tion with freely tradable shares, the shareholder always has the op-
tion of selling. This option can be quite an effective vote: If many 
shareholders sell and prices decline, the corporation becomes an at-
tractive takeover target, which poses a grave threat to the incumbent 
management. As long as the basic right to vote for the board is pre-
served, and can be purchased with shares, the market will discipline 
management in the publicly-traded business corporation. 87 
These protections are less likely to be guaranteed in a mutual 
87. R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978). 
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benefit nonprofit corporation. The amount of money involved often 
does not merit the expense of extensive legal services. Exiting will 
often entail financial sacrifice: The initiation fee will have gone for 
nothing, and the membership cannot easily be sold, if sale is even 
possible. Moreover, it can be even more difficult for the departing 
member to find an alternative provider of the service. Other mutual 
benefits in the same field might not be available to him, and since he 
originally chose a mutual benefit, any available for-profit alterna-
tives will probably be unsatisfactory. Mutual benefits, whether so-
cial clubs or child care facilities, are not fungible; sale and substitute 
purchase is not as satisfactory as it is with shares of stock. By choos-
ing a mutual benefit nonprofit provider, rather than a business enter-
prise, the member might have sacrificed his ability to "exit," i.e., to 
terminate his relationship. Exit is sacrificed in exchange for the 
promise of "voice" - indeed, membership control is the mutual 
benefit's distinctive feature as an alternative organizational form. 88 
The only vehicle for guaranteeing that feature is the nonprofit corpo-
ration law.89 
This model of the mutual benefit corporation suggests no reason 
why its managers should be governed by specially heightened fiduci-
ary obligations. As long as the democratic process is working, no 
other safeguards are needed; the rules of fiduciary responsibility 
found in the business corporation law would work perfectly well in a 
mutual benefit corporation law. Nor is there the same need for at-
torney general supervision and enforcement. In the case of donative 
nonprofits, the attorney general or other state agency acts to protect 
the interests of contributors, who may not be represented in the char-
ity's governance structure.90 If a mutual benefit is properly struc-
88. The terms "exit" and ''voice" are borrowed from A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE AND 
LOYALTY (1970). 
89. Courts have often sustained claims of procedural unfairness in nonprofit corporations, 
even though the challenged procedure violated no explicit provision in the law or in the corpo-
rate articles and bylaws. Although various explanations have been offered for such decisions, 
it seems likely that the unifying theme is in fact the necessity for preserving a minimal level of 
fairness and democracy in the governance of such organizations so that they may fulfill the 
function envisioned by the membership. This argument is developed in the context of churches 
in Ellman, supra note 12, at 1422-28. 
90. There have at times been proposals for a more democratic structure for charitable en-
terprises, but these usually focus on giving the beneficiary class some representation in the 
governing structure. I believe that the opponents of such changes have the better of this argu-
ment because they accurately point out that it is freedom from controls by donors that enables 
a private charity to make controversial decisions and to play a role distinctive from govern-
ment See Simon, Foundations and Public Controversy: An Ajjirmative View, in THE FUTURE 
OF FOUNDATIONS 58 (F. Heimann ed. 1973). Empirical studies indicate that while such demo-
cratic experiments produce a noisier board, they do not necessarily improve the decisions 
made. Cole, Constituent Involvement in Non-Profit Organizations, Working Paper #18, Pro-
gram on Nonprofit Organizations, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University 
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tured, its members will, by definition, be represented. Thus, the 
mutual benefit corporation's special need is in the area of democratic 
control: The members require a continuing voice in the policies 
adopted by the organization-the policies that guide day-to-day de-
cisions. No rules of fiduciary obligations can provide them with that 
assurance; only the guarantee of a democratic structure can fill that 
need. 
2. Some Further Applications: Trade Associations and Clubs 
Corporations or individuals engaged in a common trade or busi-
ness often form associations to promote their shared interests. These 
are certainly not donative organizations; instead, they fit comfort-
ably into the mutual benefit category. 
Trade associations are organized to serve the interests of their 
members. The organization is supported by the member dues -
dues that purchase services in much the same way that members pay 
for the services of a parent-controlled child care facility. Those ser-
vices usually consist of public relations and lobbying efforts to ad-
vance the membership's common interests, as well as the 
dissemination of information of special interest to the membership. 
Hansmann argues that: 
because it is not easy for a member to see accurately the increment in 
the organization's services that is .financed with the member's individ-
ual contribution, the member needs to rely on the nonprofit form to 
assure that all contributions will be devoted to the services that the 
organization was formed to provide.91 
Hansmann here explicitly identifies the trade association mem-
ber's problems as a difficulty in assessing the marginal impact of his 
gift. The expanded no-dividend rule is again used to explain the 
suitability of the nonprofit form, and Hansmann criticizes the few 
cases that exclude trade associations from the nonprofit world. Such 
cases usually tum on the court's construction of the no-dividend rule 
as barring a distribution of services to the membership.92 
These cases should be criticized because the nonprofit form is in 
fact appropriate to trade organizations. But those cases are gener-
(1982). A basic problem in any attempt to incorporate democratic procedures in an essentially 
paternalistic charitable organization is deciding on the appropriate constituency. Even where. 
directors are politically responsible to the contributors, rather than to the beneficiaries, con-
flicts between the directors' political responsibility and their trust obligation become possible. 
See Defender Assn. Amendment of Articles of Incorporation, 453 Pa. 353, 307 A.2d 906 
(1973). 
91. Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 557. 
92. See id. at 557-59. 
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ated by a fact that the contract failure theory denies, for they accu-
rately perceive that the trade association is fundamentally different 
from the typical donative nonprofit and is not appropriately in-
cluded in the same organizational category; trade associations are 
not donative but mutual benefit nonprofits. 
It is fairly easy for a member of a trade association to see what 
the organization has done - whether it has provided him with inf or-
mation, whether it has conducted a public relations campaign, or 
whether it has engaged in lobbying efforts. What then prevents the 
member from turning to a for-profit provider of these services? 
There would be at least two difficulties. The first, as Hansmann also 
points out, is that many of the trade association's products are public 
goods: There is no way to provide them only to those who pay for 
them. A public relations campaign asserting that milk is good for 
you or that orange juice is not just for breakfast will benefit non-
member producers of milk and orange juice as much as member pro-
ducers, and it costs as much to produce the advertisement whether 
one or one thousand producers agree io buy it. This difficulty, some-
times called the "free rider'' problem, is certainly not solved by using 
the nonprofit form: All sellers, including nonprofit ones, have diffi-
culty persuading buyers to pay for public goods, as organizers of 
faculty associations or membership directors of public television sta-
tions can attest. But the ·nonprofit trade association has one tool not 
normally available to a for-profit trade association: social pressure. 
Union organizers have used this tactic for decades, and those who 
solicit membership in trade associations use it as well. 
Another more fundamental problem of public goods is the one 
identified by Hansmann and discussed above: assessing the marginal 
impact of the member's dues. It is particularly tempting to be a "free 
rider" because it is not at all clear that by joining ·the association and 
paying dues one will increase the amount of lobbying that takes 
place. From this fact one might conclude that trade associations 
share the problem of donative nonprofits and should therefore be so 
organized. Trade associations, however, must adopt a democratic 
structure for other reasons developed below. And having done so, 
they have generated an alternative solution to the marginal-impact 
monitoring problem, one that fills their needs more effectively than 
would the package of strict fiduciary rules. 
Not all products provided by trade associations are public goods. 
Associations often disseminate information through association pub-
lications, subscriptions to which are obviously private goods. Others 
can obtain the information, but not as conveniently. Consumers 
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Union, the publisher of Consumers Reports, is essentially a trade 
association of consumers, and although it engages in some lobbying 
and produces other "public goods" on behalf of consumers, it sells 
memberships by promoting the magazine that it provides to mem-
bers. The fact that it is a consumer-controlled mutual nonprofit, 
rather than a for-profit, may help it sell that magazine by giving its 
ratings more credibility. A for-profit publisher of a consumer guide 
might have some difficulty in persuading potential buyers that its 
ratings were honest, particularly if its revenue included advertising 
by manufacturers of rated products. That difficulty is not fatal -
indeed, there are specialized for-profit magazines that evaluate prod-
ucts such as cars and photographic equipment. But the claim of 
member control, and of freedom from influence by the advertisers 
who patronize the for-profit magazines, apparently does aid Con-
sumers Union in attracting member-buyers, even though the sub-
scription cost must be raised to replace foregone advertising 
revenues. Not everyone prefers member-controlled rating agencies, 
but some people do, and Consumers Union can serve those people 
by using the nonprofit form. 
The credibility problem arises in a variety of contexts. Trade as-
sociations, for example, act as intermediaries and purchase goods 
and services on behalf of their members. Trade associations may 
hire employees to lobby or prepare advertising, or they may retain 
Washington representatives to do their lobbying and advertising 
agencies tb conduct their public relations campaigns. Not only must 
the asso'ciation be trusted to select the lobbyist or advertising agency, 
but it must also be trusted to represent fairly and accurately the 
views of its members. There is no convenient mechanism by which 
the for-profit intermediary could persuade its potential customers 
that it would faithfully represent them. This is the same problem 
experienced by the member of the child care facility: One cannot 
specify all contingencies in advance, although one has no special dif-
ficulty in monitoring performance. Trade association members can 
see the advertisements that have been produced and the results of 
the lobbying efforts; they are simply unable to specify in advance 
exactly what advertisements or lobbying they want. As with child 
care, the buyer needs a seller with good judgment who shares his 
views. 
The credibility problem can be dealt with effectively by using a 
membership corporation governed by democratic procedures, which 
selects a managing board that itself acts as the intermediary. Just as 
in the parent-run child care agency, the democratic structure is the 
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key to protecting the members' interests. The simple no-dividend 
rule is again appropriate since the organization has no interest in 
attracting outside investors, who are indifferent to the membership's 
problems and who merely seek returns to capital. Nor is the mem-
bership interested in a cash return; they are purchasing services. 
And the democratic structure, necessary to solve other problems, 
also provides a solution to the problem of monitoring the marginal 
impact of one's dues on the public goods provided by the associa-
tion. The opportunity to choose management oneself is at least as 
reassuring as the stricter fiduciary obligations, which are themselves 
only a partial solution. The time spent on involving oneself in the 
affairs of a trade association is a cost, a price of membership, but it is 
a cost that is necessary anyway to solve the credibility problem. 
That cost is not normally borne by the contributors to a donative 
nonprofit, who must rely on heightened fiduciary duties precisely be-
cause they have no other claim on the donative's management, 
which is typically self-perpetuating. 
The heightened fiduciary obligations, which provide an advan-
tage in protecting and reassuring potential contributors, are thus a 
useless burden to the association with a democratic structure. For 
example, the same arguments that support allowing shareholders to 
ratify suspect transactions apply to the members of the trade associa-
tion; it is the members' money at stake. This contrasts with the situa-
tion in the typical donative nonprofit, where the donors are not the 
members, and do not have the ultimate governing authority .. 
Strict fiduciary rules and a democratic structure are alternative 
tools. For the trade association, the democratic structure is more ap-
propriate. Indeed, some of the provisions appropriate for donative 
nonprofits would be extraordinarily inconvenient for the trade asso-
ciation. Consider, for example, the traditional trust doctrine that re-
quires a charitable organization to use its funds for its specified 
charitable purpose.93 Such a doctrine protects contributors who 
choose the particular charitable organization because they are inter-
ested in its goal of, for example, operating a museum of Chinese art. 
Those contributors, who usually have no internal governance rights 
in the organization, would be upset if the charity's board decided to 
abandon its traditional purpose, sell its collection, and use the pro-
ceeds to promote research into sickle cell anemia. Some form of the 
traditional trust rule, therefore, is entirely appropriate as part of a 
donative nonprofit corporation law.94 But it serves no purpose in the 
93. See cases cited in notes 37 & 57 supra. 
94. Of course, donative nonprofit corporations should be permitted some flexibility to alter 
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trade organization, which ought to be able to change its purposes as 
easily as a business corporation on a vote of its membership. So long 
as the members are represented in the organization's decision-mak-
ing process, there is no reason further to encumber the trade associa-
tion's flexibility in the use of its funds. Consumers Union may or 
may not favor mandatory air bags, but no matter how the board 
chooses to spend its lobbying funds, some membe~s are likely to ob-
ject. They may even claim that the expenditure is a change in associ-
ation policy. But these objecting members are adequately protected 
so long as it is reasonably possible for the membership to change the 
board or revise the decision. It would make no sense to apply to 
Consumers Union a rule allowing the attorney general, in his super-
visory authority over charitable endeavors, to seek damages against 
the incumbent directors for their failure to conform to a trust re-
quirement that association funds be used only to support, or oppose, 
mandatory highway safety devices. 
Member control is similarly advantageous in the context of clubs. 
There are many for-profit athletic clubs while there are few for-profit 
trade associations, suggesting that at least some of the services pro-
vided by clubs are perfectly amenable to the entrepreneurial form. 
Nonetheless, in some cases member control might be desirable. For 
social clubs, the process of self-government itself may be the goal. 
The meetings, elections, and discussions provide an occasion for so-
cializing and a sense of joint enterprise, which might be the very 
thing the members seek to buy. 
Member 'Control, moreover, provides a perfectly functional alter-
native to the market as a method of ensuring that the club will pro-
vide certain amenities. Members might be concerned that only 
people of a certain social class or tennis ability be admitted to ensure 
that the facilities never become overcrowded. In theory, it is per-
fectly possible for an entrepreneur with a profit motive to provide 
these services, and in fact it is occasionally done. But especially 
where members are concerned about intangible qualities, such as so-
cial class, the members might be more confident that their goal will 
be served in a club run by a member-chosen board than one run by 
outsiders seeking to maximize profits. At least they can be assured 
that the policy will not change when the entrepreneur sees a more 
advantageous profit possibility.95 
their purposes, under a doctrine analogous to the traditional trust rule of cy-pres. Rl!sTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 399 (1959). 
95. Of course, if that possibility is available to the entrepreneur, it would also be available 
to the membership, and an economist might, therefore, see no difference between the two 
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But while clubs comfortably fit the mutual benefit form, 
Hansmann concedes that they do not fit his model since there is no 
evidence of contract failure and no role for special fiduciary duties. 
The club member typically experiences neither marginal-impact 
monitoring difficulties, nor quality monitoring difficulties. As a re-
sult of his dues he gains admission, and he surely knows whether the 
facilities meet his demands. For Hansmann, the problem is to pro-
vide a home for clubs, while keeping a unitary nonprofit model. His 
solution is to treat clubs as cooperative corporations. This is a con-
venient solution since it avoids reconsidering the one-category non-
profit law. Furthermore, as Hansmann notes, the law of 
cooperatives is, if anything, even more primitive than nonprofit law. 
In the absence of any established theory of cooperatives, it is difficult 
to argue that a cooperative law will not work for social clubs, but 
Hansmann deals with the difficulty by suggesting that the coopera-
tive law should be "reformed" to meet the needs of the clubs.96 
Whether such reforms would alter the essence of cooperative laws is 
impossible to say without a theory of cooperative law. 
Nonetheless, some examination of the cooperative club proposal 
is necessary. For while Hansmann treats clubs as one minor excep-
tion to an otherwise comprehensive treatment of nonprofits, one 
theme of this Article is that many of the organizations that he sweeps 
into his net are in fact mutual benefit nonprofits. Clubs are not one 
minor exception to his comprehensive model, but rather an example 
of a major category of exceptions. If one accepts the arguments 
made above, then not only would some local social clubs be pushed 
into the cooperative laws, but so also would the Consumers Union, 
the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association; 
the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Trucking 
organizations. If the members of a mutual benefit nonprofit club are willing to restrict use of 
their valuable facility to the limited existing membership, and forego the potential additional 
members who would allow a lower fee per person, then they should also be willing to pay the 
entrepreneur whatever fees are necessary to persuade him to restrict use. But people do not 
always behave as such rational economic animals. To at least some it will seem less costly to 
continue to use a facility already owned in a less than optimal way than to pay someone else 
enough to motivate them to make the same choice with their facility. That is, people may treat 
out-of-pocket costs differently than opportunity costs. See Kelman, Production Theory, Con-
sumption Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979). 
Hansmann has also offered an argument that the nonprofit or cooperative form may permit 
the members of social clubs to avoid paying an entrepreneur monopoly prices for their own 
status. That is, to the extent that the desirability of membership in a particular club is deter-
mined by the social status of its existing members, the price that an entrepreneur could charge 
members is directly proportional to their own status. The owner of an exclusive social club, 
therefore, may acquire the power to charge its members for their own status at a monopoly 
profit. Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 3, at 892-93. 
96. Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 3, at 595-96. 
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Association, the Lions, the Masons (both national organizations and 
local affiliates), and every Board of Realtors. 
Obviously, whether these organizations are called cooperatives or 
mutual benefit nonprofits matters little, but even assuming that we 
amend the cooperative laws to fit mutual benefits, there is more than 
name in question. The problem is knowing what to do with the or-
ganizations that are already cooperatives: Will our reformed cooper-
ative law fit them too? Hansmann assumes that it will, arguing that 
there is no important difference between a cooperative and a mutual 
benefit nonprofit. The assertion is hard to evaluate with so little 
known about cooperatives, but some points can be made. 
Although some large consumer cooperatives do exist, 97 producer 
cooperatives dominate the field, and most cooperative laws appear to 
be written with them in mind.98 Producer cooperatives are economic 
organizations with only economic goals, quite unlike social clubs, 
lobbyist groups, or Consumers Union. A producer co-op seeks a 
large number of members; it is organized to take advantage of the 
economies of scale available in the-joint distribution of goods and to 
produce the highest possible profits.99 A well-drafted cooperative 
law might require considerable attention to the members' .financial 
interests in order to design reasonable rules governing the distribu-
tion of profits. Because of its economic purpose, a co-op does not 
usually place idiosyncratic restrictions, such as proper social class, 
upon admission to membership. And while nonprofit clubs have oc-
casion to expel or suspend members, sometimes for subjective rea-
sons, co-ops seldom face that question, for the cooperator has only a 
business relationship with the organization:100 The co-op is an agent 
97. The Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley, California, is by far the largest consumer 
cooperative in the nation, accounting at times in the past for as much as one half of the total 
sales of the national consumer cooperative wholesalers. The total assets of the Berkeley Co-op 
are in the neighborhood of $12 million. Ellman, On IJeveloping a Law far Nonprofit Corpora-
tions, 1979 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 153, 161 n.17. 
98. In many states the cooperative laws have contained purpose requirements that would 
appear to exclude all but agricultural and rural endeavors. Note, Associations - IJeftnilion of 
Cooperative, 11 VAND. L. R.Ev. 646 (1964). 
99. Some of the observations made here about cooperatives are also noted by Hansmann 
in Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 3, at 889-90, 891-92. 
100. When cooperatives do expel members, one would expect the reason to be a disagree-
ment over business practices. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Grain Growers Assn. of Cal, _ Cal. 3d. _, 
_ P.2d _, 176 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1981), in which the member was expelled because he declined 
to sign that year's marketing agreement, which meap.t that he did not agree to have the cooper-
ative market his produce that year. 176 Cal. Rptr. at 658. In such an expulsion, the principal 
question is whether the member is entitled to a financial settlement from the cooperative. 176 
Cal. Rptr. at 658. The dispute differs considerably from the membership expulsions normally 
seen in nonprofit corporations, and it is not at all clear that the same rules would be appropri-
ate. For material on nonprofit expulsions, see note 15 supra. 
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for the sale of its goods. Clubs, on the other hand, do not ordinarily 
have economic goals analogous to a co-op's. A member-owned so-
cial or athletic club often provides a higher-quality alternative to the 
proprietary club, rather than a less expensive one. Clubs often limit 
the number of members for a variety of reasons that may include 
maintaining an aura of exclusivity and insuring that the facilities are 
adequate for the existing members. 
Finally, there is the no-dividend rule, which we have seen fits 
comfortably with the needs of mutual benefit nonprofits. Co-ops, on 
the other hand, obviously require the ability to issue payments to 
members, although these payments need not necessarily be a return 
on equity capital. Nonetheless, they are likely to violate existing 
nonprofit rules barring dividends. A combined law would have to 
make appropriate rules for cooperative distributions without altering 
the essential characteristics of a mutual benefit nonprofit. 
In sum, it is not clear that cooperatives and mutual benefit non-
profits share the same defining rules. The producer co-op is a joint 
effort by sellers; the mutual benefit nonprofit is a joint effort by buy-
ers. Perhaps a consumer cooperative is indistinguishable from a mu-
tual benefit nonprofit, but the producer cooperative seems more like 
a partnership. It is certainly clear that existing cooperative laws do 
not fit existing mutual benefit nonprofits, which means that some 
major changes in the cooperative law would be necessary before the 
club could fit into them. A more practical suggestion would be to 
repair our nonprofit laws first. 
The question whether mutual benefit nonprofits are related so 
closely to consumer cooperatives that the two organizational forms 
should be combined is, in the end, a side point. The central points 
are that those organizations currently organized as nonprofits in fact 
fit comfortably into one of two alternative organizational forms, and 
that the nonprofit law ought to be reformed so that the needs of each 
group are effectively met. They are not met by current nonprofit 
laws, nor would they be met by a nonprofit law reformed along the 
lines suggested by Hansmann. Whether the next step is to fold ex-
isting consumer cooperatives into the reformed mutual benefit non-
profit law is a question that can be saved for consideration at a later 
day, but it seems unlikely that the cooperative form would thereby 
be rendered superfluous since producer cooperatives and mutual 
benefit nonprofits will remain very different organizational forms. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined the function of the nonprofit form. By 
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asking what problems that form of organization may solve, we can 
find out what an ideal nonprofit corporation code would look like. 
We have focused on establishing the appropriate "defining" rules for 
nonprofit corporations - the rules that establish the form's distinc-
tive characteristics. These rules, if well-conceived, promise an orga-
nizational structure with special advantages for some legitimate class 
of activity that the law seeks to encourage. 
We have concluded that there are really two sets of problems and 
two sets of solutions. The proposed donative nonprofit law is 
designed to meet the needs of an organization seeking to attract con-
tributors by including special provisions on fiduciary duties to pro-
tect their interests. These rules are particularly necessary because 
contributors do not ordinarily have governance rights in the organi-
zation. The donative nonprofit form may also be useful for other 
purposes; it might, for example, be a considerable convenience in 
formulating tax policy or mail rates to have the amorphous class of 
nonprofits clearly segregated, so that the donative nonprofits may be 
separately referenced. 
The mutual benefit nonprofit law is designed to meet the needs of 
consumers who want a customer-controlled seller. While for-profit 
sellers usually will be adequate, we have seen three instances -
child care, trade associations, and clubs - where some buyers would 
prefer the mutual benefit alternative. As an initial theoretical foray, 
this Article is necessarily general in its prescription and does not pur-
port to answer the detailed questions that a code drafter would nec-
essarily face. But it does offer a conceptual framework to guide a 
drafter's efforts. The likely outcome of laws drafted along the lines 
advanced here is a four category classification: donative nonprofits, 
to serve donors; mutual benefit nonprofits, to serve customers; coop-
erative corporations, to serve producers; and business corporations, 
to serve investors. Hansmann's work, analyzed here in detail, offers 
the only competing conception. This Article concludes that in at-
tempting to explain the entire nonprofit world through the aggre-
gated concepts of "patron" and "contract failure," Hansmann has 
produced a flawed model. · 
